ABSTRACT

One compelling aspect of American foreign policy during the Cold War was the propensity of U.S. policymakers to seek harmony between the pursuit of security objectives and a stated American belief in timeless values of peace and justice. One need look no further than monikers such as Operation Just Cause and Operation Restore Hope or to recent proclamations of an "axis of evil" for anecdotal evidence of the moral justifications of U.S. military actions. This article will systematically address the question of whether this "rhetoric of justice" which has been pressed into service as a public rationale for U.S. military intervention might consist of more than mere rhetoric. The historically grounded yet timely theory of the “just war” is applied to a set of U.S. military intervention decisions to assess conditions in which considerations of justice may have driven U.S. decisions to employ military force in international crisis.

I. OVERVIEW

Few subjects receive more attention or invite more controversy than the study of war and its causes, import, and justifications. Military philosophy dating at least to the works of Sun Tzu has characterized war as a definitive experience in international relations and an inherently political act. Since Karl von Clausewitz[1] the problem of preventing or limiting this most violent and volatile of policy instruments has emerged as a principal dilemma for international relations scholarship; Clausewitz refers to war (in an oft-cited phrase) as “policy carried out by other means” (Clausewitz, in Phillips, 1984). Stanley Hoffman (1984) has remarked that military intervention is “practically the same thing as international politics, from the beginning of time to the present.” While studies of war and conflict in a general sense have retained their relevance, research on military intervention as a particular type of conflict has accelerated in recent years, in large part due to the changing nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War (see Haass, 1999, 1994; Huth, 1998; Kegley and Hermann, 1997, 1996; Crocker, 1996; Betts, 1994; Mandelbaum, 1994; Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, 1992).

The main result of this renewed focus on intervention generally and U.S. intervention specifically is the re-emergence of the tradition of “just war”, or the just war theory (JWT). In the nineteenth and most of the 20^th century, JWT was primarily a concern for theologians and legal theorists; the former because of its historical roots in the religious instruction of Augustine and Aquinas; the latter because of disagreement over the efficacy of the theory in relationship to a supranational governing body and international law. Recent philosophical interest in the theory (particularly in the U.S.) seems to have been rekindled in large part by the insularity of the Vietnam-era war-making decision structure and the popular and academic perception that commitments of force in that conflict were made in a deliberative void (O’Brien, 1979). This interest was further intensified in the U.S. by a flurry of normative deliberation over the means and ends of modern war after the decline of détente in the 1970’s and the massive buildup of American and Soviet nuclear stockpiles that followed. The return of JWT to the public consciousness in the aftermath of Vietnam and in the face of looming nuclear catastrophe is clearly a reflection of the reality that at the core of JWT lies an informed inquiry into the moral legitimacy of the state and state behavior (NCCB, 1994).

For these very reasons, just war theory remains timely for the debate over whether and when the U.S. should intervene in international crises. It seems particularly suited to address two overlapping dimensions of the intervention calculus which have frequently arrested this debate—the ethical (what are the acceptable costs and proper ends of intervention, especially when injustice is perceived) and the political (where should the U.S. come down on the continuum of state sovereignty and individual rights). These dimensions lie at the heart of the intervention debate, and are fundamental to nearly every disagreement in the intervention literature and in policy circles. Scholarship on the intervention question clearly could benefit from an investigation of the utility of just war thinking for reconciling this fundamental tension.

This core disagreement over where American foreign policy should rest on this continuum—and possibly where it will in the future—would clearly be informed by an empirical analysis of how U.S. policy has historically fit with the precepts of just war theory. Even a cursory review of U.S. military interventions in the last half-century (or longer) reveals a distinct pattern of public moralizing in service of American military engagements, evident throughout U.S. governmental officialdom. Cultural expositions of American exceptionalism (see especially Payne, 1995) document in exquisite detail the truly peculiar aspect of American interventions, which lies not in the frequency or level of violence they have employed, but in the propensity of U.S. policymakers to seek harmony between pragmatic applications of military might and America's stated belief in peace and stability. This has been done through the employment of what is essentially the "rhetoric of justice." One can point to recent campaign monikers such as Operation Restore Freedom (Afghanistan and possibly beyond), Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) or to even more recent allegorical flourishes proclaiming the existence of an "axis of evil" in the world for telling (if anecdotal) evidence of the American proclivity to moral justifications both in planning and prosecuting military actions. More rigorous assessments of this phenomenon, for instance in the case of Operation Desert Storm, have demonstrated the extensive efforts on the part of U.S. decision leaders to use justice considerations as legitimating forces in garnering support for military engagements, in many cases successfully (Russett and Starr, 1992; The Gallup Organization, February 1991).

The question raised, posed directly, is this--is the "rhetoric of justice" which appears so serviceable as a public rationale for U.S. military intervention actually a driving force in U.S. decisions to militarily intervene? Does it truly serve as a guiding principle for decisions to employ the "military option"? This study will examine these questions with a modified subset of Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld’s International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset. In short, this article systematically assesses U.S. crisis behavior as a third-party interventionist actor during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War period (1946-1994). Specifically, U.S. crisis behavior will be analyzed to address the question of whether decisions by the United States to intervene with military force during that period reflect the three major decision rules of the jus ad bellum, the JWT’s fundamental law regulating an actor’s recourse to armed coercive action. My intent for the contribution of this study is to enhance conventional understanding about whether the U.S. has in a sense been "compelled" to intervene with military force by the presence of distinct factors in an international crisis that approximate the main tenets of just war theory, thereby reflecting a U.S. decision making rationale rooted in the theory of the just war.

II. THEORETICAL APPROACH

Conceptual Clarification and Theoretical Frameworks

U.S. decision-making concerning military intervention in international crisis is complex, and for the period covered in this study (1946-1994) has been widely associated in the literature with one or more of three broad conceptual frameworks of the national interest: hegemonic power, structural realism, and ideological conflict. Though these particular frameworks are far from all-inclusive—numerous other categories for thinking about military interventions abound, ranging from the economic imperatives of the world-systems perspective to the organizational machinations and inertia of a bureaucratic politics framework (and all points in between)[2]--Stanley Hoffman (1984) has definitively argued that they serve a particular explanatory function for thinking about interventions during the bipolar period[3]. Before progressing to an explanation of these competing interpretations of the U.S. intervention decision-making paradigm, however, a brief conceptual housecleaning is in order. James N. Rosenau was among the first to raise concerns about the inherent ambiguity of the concept of “intervention”. He attributes the deficiency of “scholarly writings on the problem of intervention…[in developing] systematic knowledge on conditions under which interventionary behavior is initiated, sustained, and abandoned” (1969, p. 149) largely to deficiencies in conceptualization. Kegley and Hermann (1997, 1996) have extended Rosenau’s concerns over conceptual imprecision to competing interpretations of military intervention as well, noting that the same conflict behavior can be classified military intervention, other intervention, or non-intervention based on differing indices (1996).

One ascendant definition, which Kegley and Hermann employ, is advanced by Herbert Tillema (1989, 1994). Tillema’s original definition of military intervention pertained to instances of “battles involving regular foreign military forces…generally resulting in less than 1000 fatalities” (1989, p.419); he later expands the criteria to include “military operations undertaken openly by a state’s regular military forces within a specific foreign land in such a manner to risk immediate combat” (1994, p.251). What is perhaps more telling in both these definitional criteria for military intervention, however, is what Tillema excludes. He is clearly pursuing a narrow conceptualization, delimiting “less blatant forms of international interference, such as covert operations, military alerts, shows of force, deployment of units not immediately prepared for combat, and incursions across international borders that do not involve occupation of territory…” (1994, p.265) as out-of-bounds in thinking about military intervention.

For the purposes of an inquiry into factors that may justify military intervention, such an exclusive definition is not entirely useful, and may actually be counter-productive. In analyzing U.S. decision-making in historical cases of intervention in order to derive generalizations about those decisions, I am seeking insight into the decision to rule out or commit to the use of a military option. This analytical question is not directly served by a concern over picking and choosing which military strategies or instruments apply; in reality the distinction of relevance is “military force” versus “something else”. In response to Rosenau’s concerns, then, it should be clarified that in all references to “military intervention”, the reference point is not simply to the deployment of conventional forces to the battlefield or the use of air or naval power in the combat zone, nor to a distinct number of battle-deaths or troop commitments. I seek a broader interpretation of the term, encompassing not only these standard elements of military action, but also what Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) refer to as “indirect” military action. Such action can and does include crisis behavior such as: the deployment of conventional forces to countries neighboring the conflict; major transfers in arms and military hardware to one or more parties involved in the conflict; the dispatch of military advisors to one or more parties involved in the conflict; the introduction of extensive covert operations in one or more countries involved in the conflict; and so forth (see also Little, 1975). The U.S. need not be directly involved in the fighting, but must at a minimum be directly involved in altering the context of that fighting through the application of military influence. “Military intervention” henceforth should be understood to construe any deliberate introduction or application of military weaponry, personnel, or intelligence intended to alter the dynamics of a conflict.

A second concept requiring clarity is that of “third party intervention.” Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1989) cite Oran Young’s (1967) definition, “any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and therefore to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself.” My conceptualization of third party intervention encompasses the first part of this definition (any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to an international crisis), but by necessity rejects the second; intent to resolve a crisis (as will be explored further below) is one of the fundamental elements to be tested in assessing whether an intervention is just. It is neither implausible nor improbable to think that third party intervention may be directed against termination of the crisis, particularly if the third party is a unilateral actor; this would run decisively counter to JWT[4]. Finally, third party intervention can include diplomatic, economic, and political activity as well as military action.

These fundamental concepts defined, I turn to the aforementioned “explanatory frameworks”—hegemonic power, structural realism, and ideological conflict—that have guided interpretations of U.S. intervention in the Cold War era and immediate post-Cold War period (hereafter merged and referred to jointly as “the Cold War era”)[5]. For proponents of the hegemony viewpoint such as Luard (1988) and Petersen (1976), U.S. conflict behavior diverged from international norms dictating non-interference in sovereign affairs both more frequently and more profoundly when the setting of the crisis was within its hemispheric zone of political and economic influence; namely the countries of Latin America. Structural realism explains intervention decisions as driven predominantly by the stabilizing functions they serve, in securing power relations within the international system (Linklater, 1995). Thus, U.S. military intervention can be best understood in this sense by the role it plays in the stability of security alliances or “blocs”, which are the key to stability in an updated balance-of-power system under loose bipolarity (Kaplan, 1957). Proponents of ideological factors as a rationale for U.S. military intervention (Katz, 1991 and Huntington, 1987) contend that U.S. military intervention has been driven largely by the zealous desire to spread liberal democracy across the globe—most especially where the evils of Communism were in danger of taking root, citing the bold pronouncements of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan Doctrines as empirical examples.

All three frameworks—hegemonic power, structural realism, and ideological conflict—operate under the assumption that some concept of the “national interest” drives U.S. decisions to militarily intervene in a crisis (though their understandings of what that national interest is vastly differ). All three also assume some variation of a unitary rational actor model as it applies to nation-states, in the sense that preferences related to their concept of “national interest” can be identified, ordered, selected, and decisively acted upon. Finally, and most importantly, all three locate the primary decision criteria for whether or not the U.S. decided to intervene largely in systemic-level factors—be they regional power, alliance maintenance, or ideological competition (with Soviet communism) rather than in actor-level decision making. In doing so, these frameworks to some extent restrict the agency of individual decision-makers and the decision-making collective within the country contemplating intervention (in this case, the U.S.). Decisions about military intervention in these frameworks can in part be decided for a country by systemic-level variables, which in and of themselves are susceptible to highly unpredictable degrees of variation due to their exposure to a variety of extenuating systemic circumstances. Though inarguably, as Boyer and Wilkenfeld (1989) have demonstrated, systemic constraints played a definite role in U.S. involvement in crisis generally during the Cold War, from a retrospective position systemic factors would seem to provide only a partial explanation. Furthermore, all three frameworks are inadequate for explaining current and future crises given that they are predicated on a Cold War bipolarity that no longer exists.

In this examination of U.S. decision-making concerning military intervention in international crisis, I hypothesize and test for the presence of a fourth possible explanatory framework for U.S. military interventionism in the period since World War II; namely the jus ad bellum law of the just war theory. Because the jus ad bellum law is really a precautionary principle, allowing the use of force only as a last resort and only to a degree proportionate to that which is needed to bring about peace, it provides a framework with greater space for individual and cumulative deliberation than other more structurally-bound approaches.

Origins and Precepts of Just War Theory

The origins of a recognizable theory of the just war are commonly traced to Augustine’s notion of “the Two Cities”, in which justice can only be gained in the temporal sphere through the measured ethical conduct of statecraft (see Phillips, 1984). Though this justice is imperfect and incomplete at best—nothing more could be expected in the fallen, earthly realm—it is worth pursuing, because as Augustine points out, “we can make use of the peace of Babylon”, if for nothing else than to steel ourselves in the pursuit of the City of God (Augustine, tr. Wand, 1963). Specifically, Augustine offers a formula for the restoration of peace that includes the commonly cited themes of a just war as one limited by its purpose, authority, and conduct. War properly conducted must be led by rulers of nations, obliged to maintain peace, who prosecute war to revenge wrongs and undo injustices but never in the spirit of vengeance (ibid.)

Following on Augustinian thought approximately a century later, Thomas Aquinas offered a restatement and degree of clarification that justifies his frequent association with the theory. In Part II, Question 40, "Of War" in the Summa Theologica (Aquinas, tr. Sullivan, 1952), he specified three clear and irrefutable conditions for a just war: legitimate authority must be received from the sovereign; a just cause for the attack must be present; and a rightful intention should guide the proceedings, so that the advancement of good is the sole purpose of going to war. In stating these general precepts of the just war, Aquinas is clearly seeking to explore the possibilities of his distinction between Human and Natural Law on the one hand, and Eternal Law on the other. Though war in and of itself reflects humanity’s fallen condition, a war prosecuted justly is consistent with Aquinas’ proclamation that humans should strive through the use of reason and human intelligence to discipline Human Law (laws enacted by governments) to the strictures of Natural Law (humanity’s best attempt at replicating Eternal Law in the temporal sphere).

Just war’s antecedents can be located long before the writings of Augustine or Aquinas on the subject; for example, Plato extensively discusses the rules of war in The Republic, and Hebrew teachings appear in the Old Testament calling for limits to destruction and violence in the conquest of Canaan (Deut. 2), grieving over violence and offering appeals to the God who can bring war to an end and destroy its implements in the Psalms (Ps. 46; 120), and condemning atrocities in war (Amos 1-2). Nonetheless, it is these two classical theologians and the common theme that binds them—that humanity, though fallen, is nonetheless worth attempting to preserve through humankind’s best attempts at establishing and maintaining peace and order according to the dictates of the divine and eternal law—that serves to frame just war theory in the modern mindset.

The theory of the just war emerging from this tradition and refined and clarified throughout the centuries is actually of two parts, a deliberation over the initiation of war (jus ad bellum) and a set of questions over proper conduct in war (jus in bello), of which the former is the focus of this research[6]. The jus ad bellum law is an attempt at setting cautious limitations on the initiation of military action to ensure it retains a just character (Phillips); as Johnson economically states, it is “how to justify a resort to war” (Johnson, p. 27); O’Brien calls it simply a war-decision law. Though critics have charged just war theory with being purposefully under-specified (pointing to cases of historical misapplication by religious authorities to justify military campaigns as evidence of its selectivity), the law as formulated is crucial for addressing Kantian concerns over the pursuit of liberal goals through illiberal actions[7].

The five main principles delineating a “just war” in accordance with the jus ad bellum test are:

1. Presence of just cause

2. Presence of competent authority to act

3. Right intention in action

4. Reasonable hope of success

5. Overall proportionality of good (ends desired) [8]

Johnson states that the first three principles are predominant both in development of the theory and in its historical application; this is borne out in consulting other scholarship on the subject (see especially O’Brien and Phillips). Possessing just cause is the first and arguably most important condition of jus ad bellum, since its presence is wholly fundamental to further deliberation over the use of force.

The most common criteria defining the right to resort to force for these three principles in an ethical sense[9] are, for just cause: a) defense of the innocent against wrongful attack; b) the reclamation of persons, property, or other things of value which were wrongly taken; and c) the punishment of fundamentally “evil” acts against humanity. In the case of competent authority, the lone criterion is that military action must be clearly sanctioned by a duly authorized representative of some sovereign political authority[10]. Right intention has two definitions (both steeped in Augustinian thought), each with associated criteria; in its negative connotation, it refers to military action marked by the absence of: a) territorial acquisition; b) intimidation or coercion; or c) cruelty, hate, or vengeance. In its positive connotation, it consists of military action possessing either: a) peacekeeping; or b) justice building efforts.

Modern Treatments and Applications of Just War Theory

Possibly the definitive treatment of JWT during the Cold War era was the National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ pastoral letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (NCCB, 1983), which simultaneously elucidated both the principles and premises of the just war tradition within the Catholic Church and the currency of its application to modern methods of war, especially (but not exclusively) of the nuclear variety. Throughout the text, the main concern of The Challenge of Peace… is the exposition of what it states to be transcendent and universal moral principles concerning war and peace which emphasize the intrinsic dignity and value of all human life and the extensive applicability of codes providing for the ethical conduct of warfare (i.e., the just war principles) for civil and religious leaders alike in protecting that dignity and value. The letter affirms the applicability of JWT for modernity, contending that the objects as well as the methods of its precaution remain valid sources of concern regardless of evolutionary developments in war-making or the international system. Moreover, the letter exhorts those concerned with curbing the savagery of war to “look at the world as it is, not simply as we would want it to be (p.22).” In this, the letter’s authors contend, the just war tradition offers its practitioners not only a set of principles to objectively examine and guide their own decisions and conduct in the prosecution of war, but also provides them with the necessary space for the objective examination of the conduct of other involved parties and of the context and dynamics of the situation itself. Though one’s moral agency is restricted in terms of goal selection—one’s inalienable obligation is to defend peace against aggression at every turn—it is unleashed with respect to moral deliberation over the appropriate means for attaining this goal—means which clearly can take the shape of a just war if the appropriate conditions for embarking on such a campaign entail.

In concert with the NCCB pastoral letter, JWT has been applied to the questions of modern warfare and statecraft in works by Paul Ramsay (1968), Michael Walzer (1977), William V. O’Brien (1979), Robert L. Phillips (1984), and most recently, J.T. Johnson (1999). Though each of these explorations in just war theory are marked by particular differences of opinion over implementation questions (which for the most part are outside the scope of this paper)[11], all share the notion that just war theory is a synthesis of both idealist and realist conceptions of the utility of war, transcending abstract moral ideals (Johnson, 1999). This body of scholarship also asserts that historical and present-day realities display evidence of just war theory in statecraft, military strategy, and international law[12]. For Walzer, the jus ad bellum is closely associated with what he terms the “theory of aggression”—that is, that a war is justifiable if it is embarked upon to fight against aggression, to enforce norms or laws against aggression, or to punish aggressors. While other theorists offer finer distinctions for the proper ends of intervention, including the protection of non-combatants from harm (O’Brien) and the upholding of principles such as self-determination (Phillips) and human rights (Johnson), in all cases a system-maintaining function—not incompatible with the frameworks discussed earlier—is tendered. JWT also operates under the same assumptions as the three explanatory frameworks discussed earlier (a unitary rational actor model and a distinct conception of “national interest”, with the aforementioned system stability a key part of that interest[13]).

The key point where just war theory diverges from the other three frameworks is in its distinctively actor-oriented approach. It provides for a much greater role for domestic factors in decision making about intervention. This is attributable to the theory’s roots in the metaphorical social contract and in respecting the rights of the individual. As Walzer (p.53-54) puts it, “states are neither organic wholes nor mystical unions…individual rights to life and liberty underlie the most important judgements that we make about war.” These theoretical boundaries have great implication for moral reasoning about the decision to employ military force. First, they provide a much greater emphasis on moral agency and moral responsibility in military decision making, both in weighing the decision to employ military force (and in determining the target and extent of that force) and in accepting the consequences of that decision. Second, JWT’s reliance on the virtue of the social contract between the state and the individual both preserves and re-orients the importance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Modern interpretations of just war theory rest on the idea that the state represents the highest aspirations of humanity, and derives its moral relevance largely from its function in protecting and promoting human rights (Walzer). Conversely, the state loses this moral relevance when, to use Locke’s term, it reflects a “long train of abuses” (Phillips, p.22) of its citizens. Therefore, just war theory reconciles the concepts of sovereignty and human rights, by clarifying that the principle of state sovereignty does not exist in a vacuum.

Among criticisms of the underlying assumptions of JWT, two in particular stand out and deserve attention here. The first critique rests on the theory’s focus on preserving individual liberties, which almost universally justifies intervention with all necessary (including military) force. The second is the theory’s origins in—and some would argue, reliance on—the belief in a common moral authority (Bull, 1979). While both are significant normative critiques of just war theory, neither is especially relevant to this study. In reply to the first critique, I will acknowledge that what are proposed as individual “rights” by just war theorists (particularly by Walzer) are certainly steeped in a culturally specific, Lockean conception of the notion of rights. However, can one really argue that this notion does not overlap with the understanding of rights held by most if not all U.S. decision-makers during the Cold War, given Locke’s influence in shaping American governing structures, documents, and political culture? Given that this study is concerned with U.S. decision making about U.S. interventions, this overlap in actuality inverts a critical argument into a supporting one, worthy of hypothesis. In a sense, what is being analyzed here is the political culture of U.S. decision-makers during the relevant time period, so the possibility that JWT is “culturally loaded” (a curious argument anyway) is irrelevant as long as the cultural contexts are shared.

Regarding the critique of the theory's reliance on a common moral authority, JWT is in arguably derived from age-old concepts of natural law and a universal common good, stemming from its origins in 4^th century theology. To conclude that this necessarily renders the theory hopelessly invalid for application in a global society that is decidedly more secular and less receptive to Church pronouncements would be to ignore the rise of liberalism and positive law in the 20^th century, as first embodied in the League of Nations and subsequently and more effectively in the United Nations. Though these supra-national governing bodies contain well-documented divisions and contradictions, one concept they have successfully advanced is a legal and normative consensus about war, if not a moral one. Critics dismissing the theory's relevance in the contemporary world system based on its reliance on a source of supreme authority (originally God, or at least God's will divined through humans) miss the point that, on matters of war, a common and overarching (though far-less supreme) authoritative structure persists, at present in the form of the UN and affiliated IGOs.

By testing for the application of the jus ad bellum decision rule and its three main principles—just cause, competent authority, and right intention—in U.S. intervention in the Cold War era, I am seeking to advance a contextually sensitive means of assessing how the U.S. has conceived of the acceptable costs and proper ends of intervention, especially in the face of perceived grave injustice—earlier called the ethical dimension of the intervention calculus. I am also seeking a qualitatively different way of assessing how U.S. decision-makers have proceeded in trying (or not trying) to reconcile state sovereignty and individual rights—previously referred to as the political dimension. Both of these dimensions are informed by just war theory in large part because the theory reconciles the two dimensions. It does this by focusing on individuals as keys on both “ends” of the intervention decision (that is, in deciding to intervene on the one hand, and in the violation of rights sufficient to justify an intervention on the other). In doing so, it directly addresses what Gacek (1996) calls the conceptual tension between the logic of the ends and logic of the means of war. JWT provides us with a robust tool for evaluating: the justice of preemptive first strikes; intervening on behalf of succession and national liberation movements; counter-intervention to correct power imbalance by initial intervention; and the right to intervene with force in scenarios that shock the human conscience (Bull, 1979). Instead of analyzing intervention cases based on their adherence to a hegemonic, structural realist, or ideological orthodoxy, the particular and peculiar dynamics of each intervention can be fully examined on their own merits, openly acknowledging what Johnson (1999, p.2) calls the “dilemma that moral questions posed by war change by war and by form of war.”

III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Study Objectives

This research systematically tests for the presence of just war thinking in U.S. intervention policy by measuring a set of conditional variables in a crisis approximating the three main precepts—just cause, competent authority, and right intention—of the jus ad bellum law of just war theory. These "just war variables" assess whether and to what extent—by their presence or absence—U.S. decisions to intervene with some measure of military force were impacted by just war considerations. These variables are also contrasted with a set of control variables representing the three explanatory frameworks outlined above (regional hegemony, structural realism, and ideological conflict), to test the impact of these frameworks against the impact of jus ad bellum. The three hypotheses below address the influence of various elements of just war theory and contending frameworks on U.S. Cold War-era interventions.

H1. The probability of the U.S. employing military force in a Cold War-era intervention will increase if one or more of the three major principles of jus ad bellum is evident in a crisis.

This hypothesis arises directly from the assumption, explained above, that just war theory in general and the jus ad bellum law in particular provides for greater agency in decision-making about intervention. Stated this way, it pre-supposes two interesting phenomena about U.S. decision-making during the Cold War era; the first being that U.S. decision makers were strongly inclined if not predisposed to selecting the military option when intervening as a third party. If, as shown above, the jus ad bellum decision rules provide a greater role both for agency in decision-making and for finer distinctions on ethical and political grounds, and yet the probability of intervention still increases, it may reasonably be inferred that U.S. intervention policy in a sense favored the military option. The second is that U.S. decision-making about intervention with military force was strongly influenced by considerations of justice—either the promotion of justice or the correction of injustice. If military intervention has a higher probability of being the policy instrument of choice when “just war variables” are present, at the least we can infer that justice was a key component of Cold War era decision-making about intervention (we might also infer that U.S. decision-makers believed that injustice deserved to be corrected with force, or that they felt that injustice was a compelling rationale domestically, though neither of these far-reaching inferences are testable in the models presented below).

H2. The probability of the U.S. employing military force in a Cold War-era intervention is most affected by the evidence of the “just cause” principles of jus ad bellum in a crisis.

In advancing this hypothesis, I am testing whether U.S. military intervention in the Cold War era, if influenced by just war considerations at all, was most strongly influenced by the “just cause” principles. From a purely speculative standpoint, the just cause principle and its major defining criteria—defense against wrongful attack; the reclamation of persons or property wrongfully taken; and the punishment of misanthropic deeds—would appear to have greater and more immediate resonance within U.S. foreign policy decision-making circles. Tested here is also the implicit assumption that the other two principles—the presence of competent authority and an assuredly right intention—are of less importance to decision-makers contemplating military intervention. In a sense, H2 reflects an attempt to measure not only the explanatory “fit” of the jus ad bellum, but to identify which component of that law is the most compelling in U.S. decisions to militarily intervene in a Cold War-era crisis.

H3: The impact of the principles of jus ad bellum on the probability of the U.S. to employ military force in a Cold War-era intervention is not significantly affected by regional hegemony, structural realist, or ideological conflict considerations.

This hypothesis encompasses the possible influences of three other explanatory frameworks on the strength of jus ad bellum influences on U.S. military intervention decisions. First, it asserts that jus ad bellum principles, should they apply, are as likely to apply in the traditional zones of U.S. dominance—that is, the Western Hemisphere, and Latin America in particular—as in other regions. This hypothesis should not be construed as an assertion that U.S. policy was devoid of an interest in retaining hegemonic influence in that region. Instead, it simply states that in cases of U.S. intervention where justice considerations (as reflected in the “just war variables”) were strong, the likelihood of the U.S. to employ military force in that conflict was neither positively or negatively affected by geographic proximity—the justice component stands on its own as a compelling rationale. Secondly, it contends that U.S. decisions to militarily intervene in a Cold War-era crisis in which the “just war variables” were prominent were not profoundly shaped by the presence of a strong U.S. political or military ally as a crisis actor. This hypothesis presumes that, if U.S. military intervention were motivated by a desire to promote justice or correct injustice, said motivations would reflect a pure or absolute conception of justice or injustice, without regard for who was being transgressed against. Finally, this hypothesis directly confronts the conventional wisdom that conflict with the USSR over its perceived totalitarianism was an overriding factor in U.S. decision-making concerning third-party military intervention. What the ideological conflict model really asserts is that U.S. military intervention was motivated by a desire to check the spread of “the Evil Empire”, but operated only in cases in which the Soviet Union itself was not directly engaged in military combat[14]. The most important outcome in this respect, should this hypothesis be supported in the analysis, is that justice considerations alone were seen as a sufficiently compelling rationale to support U.S. military intervention during the Cold War era, regardless of whether or not some ideological gain viz. the USSR could be reaped[15].

While Hypotheses 1 and 2 test for the presence of jus ad bellum principles in general and one principle in particular (respectively), what Hypothesis 3 attempts is a test of the strength of the jus ad bellum law in various contexts—namely, the geographic, structural, and ideological contexts of the dominant explanatory frameworks for U.S. military intervention. While the structure of these latter three hypotheses betray an approach that is admittedly biased against the prior three frameworks (in that it only tests the influence of these frameworks on interventions in which some just war criteria has also already been shown), this bias is entirely consistent with the objective of this paper to test the strength of just war theory as a fourth alternative explanatory framework. What is important here is whether and how the other frameworks interact with the just war theory as embodied in the jus ad bellum principles, not how compelling they might be on their own, or how the just war theory interacts with them. Though these would be interesting questions for separate analysis, they detract from the critical reason for incorporating the three alternative frameworks in this paper—to examine whether the partial and systemically driven explanation these frameworks provide directly negates any explanatory power found in the more actor-oriented just war theory. For similar reasons, the nullification of any or all of the hypotheses would prove as valid and valuable as supporting them. Finding that the jus ad bellum law has not been important in Cold War military interventions, or that “just cause” is the least important of the three principles, or that justice considerations are not resilient in the face of geographic, alliance, or ideological factors, would be at least as serviceable in generalizing about the political and ethical deliberations of decision-makers concerning military intervention as “proving” them.

Methodology

In this research, three distinct but interrelated analyses are conducted:

Stage 1a: an analysis of the presence, absence, and relative strength of the three main precepts of the jus ad bellum law, that is, just cause, competent authority, and right intention;
Stage 1b: an analysis of the absolute strength of the jus ad bellum law alone in statistically explaining the likelihood with which the U.S. embarked upon the use of military force in an international crisis; and
Stage 2: an analysis of the strength of the jus ad bellum law in statistically explaining the likelihood with which the U.S. embarked upon the use of military force in an international crisis upon introduction of the three other explanatory frameworks advanced above (regional hegemony, structural realism, and ideological conflict).

To conduct these analyses in a coherent fashion, I have chosen to employ a binomial logistic regression model based on existing and modified variables from the ICB-1 (system-level) International Crisis Behavior dataset created by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 171 cases of U.S. intervention (of any type, ranging from diplomatic statements to deployment of U.S. ground forces) were selected for inclusion in the analysis. Cases in which the U.S. was not involved at all (USINV=1) were excluded based on the focus of this analysis being selection of the military option when intervening. Case selections were based on the following criteria, consistent with the focus of this paper on U.S. interventions in the Cold-War era (1946-1994) and the concept of “third party intervention” as defined above[16]:

1.) any U.S. involvement (low-level, covert/semi-military, or military);

2.) intervention target state must be subject to significant direct threat (only verbal and economic threats were excluded);

3.) crisis did not feature U.S. as initial direct crisis actor (thereby excluding the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, and “hard” Cold War cases such as standoffs over Berlin, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis).

This latter criterion deserves fuller explanation; in treating this paper as an analysis of U.S. third-party military interventions, it was necessary to include only those crises that were not a direct and immediate threat to U.S. existence or national security and/or were not precipitated by U.S. action. To illustrate, U.S. involvement in Laos prior to full-scale U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia (“Pathet Lao Offensive”, case #180), or with Cambodia after disengagement from that theatre (“Mayaguez”, case # 259) were accepted under my criteria, but intra-war crises occurring during that full-scale involvement (“Tet Offensive”, case #225) were rejected. Intra-war, protracted crises (such as the series of Arab-Israeli conflicts in the Middle East) were fully eligible for inclusion, provided the U.S. played some third-party interventionist role, and there was a significant threat to one or more target states. The eligibility of all cases of crisis included herein for this analysis was determined in a multi-stage process based initially on the empirical characterizations by Brecher and Wilkenfeld included within the ICB dataset and then corroborated using crisis summaries provided by Bercovitch and Jackson (1997) and Tillema (1991).

The dependent variable throughout the analysis is as follows: y = the level of military commitment by the U.S. in a crisis intervention. A dichotomous scale was used to measure the level of military force utilized by the U.S. as a third party in a crisis intervention, with the resulting dependent variable “Military”: 0 = “no military intervention”, and 1 = “military intervention”. These classifications are based on the ICB values for U.S. involvement (USINV); 0, or the non-military value, consists of a recoding of ICB value 2 (“low-level U.S. activity”), while 1, or the military value, consists of collapsing ICB values 3 (“U.S. covert or semi-military activity”) and 4 (“U.S. direct military activity”) in accordance with my earlier, necessarily broad definition of “military intervention” geared toward elucidating the decision to rule out or commit to the use of military force[17].

Given my present analytical focus on drawing a dichotomous distinction between the use or non-use of military force in intervention cases (that is, some or any military force contrasted with none at all), I have chosen to employ a binomial logistic (probabilistic) regression model, rather than relying on the more common multiple (ordinary least squares) regression model. This is largely because of the dichotomous character of the dependent variable and my use of ordinal and nominal independent variables; because of these characteristics, a linear relationship with normally distributed independent and dependent variables cannot be assumed, and logistic regression must be employed. For the purposes of this analysis, the primary and most relevant difference between logistic and OLS regression is that logistic regression transforms the dependent variable (y) in order to calculate changes in the probability of y occurring with a unit change in any independent variable (xⁿ), with all other independent variables held constant.

In order to test for the strength of the jus ad bellum law of the just war theory in U.S. decision-making about military intervention in cases in which the U.S. did carry out some form of intervention in all three stages of my analysis, a number of independent variables or “just war variables” were identified. A small number of these independent variables were new introductions into the ICB dataset; many were created as composites of existing ICB variables; in some cases currently existing ICB variables were utilized directly. I demonstrate below the ways in which each of these just war variables precisely depict contextual features of conflict as well as the ways in which they approximate the three main principles of the jus ad bellum law. The utility of these just war variables lies in their ability to allow inferences to be drawn (from their presence or absence and relative strength) about the application of the three principles of the jus ad bellum and the just war model in U.S. military intervention decision-making in empirical cases. For purposes of clarification, the term “target state” is used to refer to the country in which the U.S. intervened (not necessarily on behalf of); the term “triggering state” or “triggering entity” refers to the generally accepted initiator of the crisis (as based on ICB coding and case summaries); and finally, the term “crisis actor”, in accord with Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s definition (1997), refers to states feeling all three elements of crisis (threat to basic values, finite time for decisions, and an increase in war likelihood). For ease of interpretation, the variables are listed and explained below under the three main principles of the jus ad bellum law. They are also represented in Figures 1 and 2, graphical depictions of the analytical approach provided in Appendix C.

IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As noted above, a two-tiered logistic regression model was used in this analysis, corresponding to the stages of analysis.

Table 1. Analytical and Methodological Approach

Stage 1a: an analysis of the presence, absence, and relative strength of the three main precepts of the jus ad bellum law, that is, just cause, competent authority, and right intention		Tier 1: a logistic regression analysis of all independent variables across the three jus ad bellum principles to assess the explanatory strength of this model for the Cold War era
Stage 1b: an analysis of the absolute strength of the jus ad bellum law alone in statistically explaining the likelihood with which the U.S. embarked upon the use of military force in an international crisis		Tier 1: a logistic regression analysis of all independent variables across the three jus ad bellum principles to assess the explanatory strength of this model for the Cold War era
Stage 2: an analysis of the strength of the jus ad bellum law in statistically explaining the likelihood with which the U.S. embarked upon the use of military force with introduction of the three main competing explanatory frameworks		Tier 2: a logistic regression analysis of the jus ad bellum ‘meta-model’ with control variables introduced to gauge effects of other explanatory frameworks on the “just war variables”

Standard logistic regression was used in Tier 1 in order to assess the predictive power of all three jus ad bellum precepts, (addressing H1 and H2); introducing all independent variables also allowed for the evaluation of the general explanatory strength of the jus ad bellum law (also addressing H1). Finally, in Tier 2, control variables reflecting the main competing frameworks (regional hegemony, structural realism, ideological conflict) were introduced into the model to gauge their effects on the explanatory power of the just war variables (addressing H3). To check for multicollinearity, a series of bivariate correlations were calculated for all the independent variables, including the controls, with no evidence of multicollinearity using r=.70 as a benchmark. The calculated correlation coefficients were in the expected direction in all cases.

The results of the logistic regression analysis testing the relative and total strength of the jus ad bellum precepts in explaining U.S. military intervention decisions are presented in Table 2. Taking into account that the independent variables included in this analysis reflect only my interpretation of the just war theory generally and the jus ad bellum law specifically, it would appear that the Tier 1 model approximating the main just war criteria hangs closely with empirical cases of U.S. interventions in the Cold War-era.

Table 2. Tier 1 Logit Analysis for U.S. Military Intervention Decision

	Coefficient	Significance

Just Cause

Direct violent crisis trigger	.999	.012**
*Power discrepancy scale (trigger-target)*	.256	.008***
*Triggering Entity (non-state actor)*	1.916	.102
*Triggering Entity (state actor)*	1.200	.210
*Territory seized*	.429	.162
*U.S. Property or persons seized*	3.319	.009***
*Gravity of threat (trigger-target)*	-.330	.281
*Dictatorial regime involved crisis actor*	1.382	.001***

Competent Authority
Global Organization Authority	-.935	.052*
*Regional Organization Authority*	1.038	.042**
*Target State Authority*	1.079	.006***
Right Intention
Pace of abatement from U.S. involvement	1.009	.007***
*Formality of outcome*	-.167	.195
N –2LL –2LL at convergence Pseudo-R square (Nagelkerke, 1991)	171 223.970 164.644 .402

The just cause variables of 'direct violent crisis trigger', 'power discrepancy scale (trigger to target)', 'property/persons seized (U.S.)', and 'dictatorial regime involved actor' are all statistically significant at a fairly robust level of .05 or greater[18]; the involvement of a dictatorial regime achieved the highest overall level of statistical significance among all independent variables in the Tier 1 model at t=.001. Assessing the associated coefficients of the statistically significant just cause variables shows an expected positive increase in the log odds of military intervention associated with an increase in any of these variables. By far the most dramatic increase in probable odds of military intervention is not obtained by the presence of a dictatorial regime, but by the seizure of American property or persons (approximately triple the positive impact on log odds of militarily intervening contrasted with the impact of the presence of a dictatorial regime). Among the competent authority variables, the authorization of a target state ('target state authority') was most significant (at the .01 level) and was also associated with a substantial increase in the log odds of militarily intervening. The conveyance of authorization for the military action by a regional or global organization was also statistically significant. With the right intention dimension, 'U.S. pace of abatement'--that is, an overarching objective to de-escalate the crisis--was a statistically significant predictor of American decisions to intervene with military force at the .01 level.

The results of the Tier 1 model demonstrate a general resonance for all three of the jus ad bellum precepts within American decision making about the use of force in third party intervention decisions, though for the most part perceptions of the unjust nature of the cause of the conflict in question trump the authority and intention elements of the decision law. A notable exception is the case where authorization is provided by the nation-state targeted for aggression (essentially an appeal for assistance), which is second only to the involvement of a dictatorial regime in statistical significance and exhibits higher probable odds of intervention than two of the four just cause variables.

These findings confirm both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, though further clarification is in order. Simply, the case could be made that the only 'hard' justice-based considerations that achieved significance in the Tier 1 model were those measuring the power discrepancy between crisis trigger and crisis target, the presence of a dictatorial regime in a crisis, and the presence of authorization from the crisis target state. Though the variable with the most profound impact on the probability of U.S. application of military force to a crisis is (perhaps unsurprisingly) the seizure of American property or persons, there is reason to speculate that the statistically significant role of this crisis variable may be derived in part from traditionally realist conceptions of national interest rather than a purely justice-based rationale. In sum, however, the presence of an overarchingly moralistic character to U.S. military intervention decision-making seems evident in the Tier 1 results, particularly with respect to the involvement in a crisis of a profoundly undemocratic regime type, to the presence of an appeal for help from a state transgressed upon by another state, and to the existence of a large power imbalance between aggressor and aggressed.

Generally speaking, the results of the Tier 1 model also demonstrate that an adequate justifying cause for military intervention is a more robust factor than other justice considerations such as legitimating authority or right intention in making determinations about an intervention, adding additional (though weak) support to Hypothesis 1, but strong confirmation to Hypothesis 2. Only two of the variables depicting the other two main precepts of the jus ad bellum decision-rule were statistically significant at .01 and had positive log odds. Another notable finding was the statistical significance of regional organizations as legitimating sources of authority for American military decision-making. This result may be somewhat misleading, given the weak position of regional governance organizations relative to the superpowers during the Cold War. The finding of this surprisingly resonant source of legitimatization for U.S. military decision-makers would only be accurate if the "legitimizing" statements or actions of RGOs were reached independently within their structures and membership, from the 'bottom up'; that is to say, if they were crafted without American influence. It is entirely conceivable that the statistical significance of RGO authorization to U.S. decisions to employ the military option may just reflect RGOs serving as a post-hoc "rubber stamp" for American desires for engagement in zones of conflict. This interpretation is partially confirmed by the lesser statistical significance and negative coefficient associated with the global organization variable, approximating the notably independent and less captive United Nations organization. The high statistical significance of 'U.S. pace of abatement' on the right intention dimension, however, is a strong indicator of the presence of this jus ad bellum precept. The finding that the presence of an overarching U.S. interest in de-escalating the crisis positively impacted the log odds of pursuing a military approach is an empirical example of the linkage of 'might' and ‘right’ in U.S. foreign policy decisions.

The significance and coherence of the jus ad bellum law of just war theory cannot be confirmed without analyzing it in the light of the competing explanatory frameworks discussed at length above. Accordingly, the results of the logistic regression analysis of the jus ad bellum 'meta-model', controlling for the presence of variables representing the three competing explanatory frameworks, are presented in Table 3. The most telling aspect of the introduction of these controls is the degree of consistency in statistical significance from the earlier stage analysis. With one exception—gravity of threat achieved significance at the .1 level in the Tier 2 model--the statistically significant variables in Tier 2 were the same as the results in Tier 1.

Table 3. Tier 2 Logit Analysis for U.S. Military Intervention Decision (with Controls)

	Coefficient	Significance
Just Cause
Direct violent crisis trigger	1.180	.009***
*Power discrepancy scale (trigger-target)*	.248	.019**
*Triggering Entity (non-state actor)*	1.833	.127
*Triggering Entity (state actor)*	1.031	.255
*Territory seized*	.320	.251
*U.S. Property or persons seized*	3.967	.006***
*Gravity of threat (trigger-target)*	-1.028	.051*
*Dictatorial regime involved crisis actor*	1.950	.000***
Competent Authority
*Global Organization Authority*	-1.219	.026**
*Regional Organization Authority*	1.636	.008***
*Target State Authority*	1.428	.002***
Right Intention
Pace of abatement from U.S. involvement	.844	.030**
*Formality of outcome*	-.145	.250

Control Variables
Geographic location of crisis	-.057	.471
*U.S. ally involved crisis actor*	.833	.005***
*USSR involved crisis actor*	1.364	.003***
N –2LL –2LL at convergence Pseudo-R square (Nagelkerke, 1991)	171 223.970 143.658 .504

1. Azerbaijan, 1945-46

2. Communism in Poland, 1946-47

3. Turkish Straits, 1946

4. Greek Civil War II, 1946-47

5. Communism in Hungary, 1947

6. Marshall Plan, 1947

7. Indonesian Independence II, 1947-48

8. Palestine Partition/Israel Independence,
1947-49

9. Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948

10. Costa Rica/Nicaragua I, 1948-49

11. Indonesian Independence III, 1948-49

12. Sinai Incursion, 1948-49

13. Soviet Bloc/Yugoslavia, 1949-51

14. Punjab War Scare I, 1951

15. Suez Canal, 1951-52

16. Catalina Affair, 1952

17. Infiltration into Burma, 1953-54

18. Invasion of Laos I, 1953

19. East German Uprising, 1953

20. Trieste II, 1953

21. Qibya, 1953

22. Guatemala, 1953-54

23. Dien Bien Phu, 1954

24. Taiwan Strait I, 1954-55

25. Costa Rica/Nicaragua II, 1955

26. Baghdad Pact, 1955

27. Gaza Raid-Czechosolovakia Arms,
1955-56

28. Qalqilya, 1956

29. Poland Liberalization, 1956

30. Hungarian Uprising, 1956-57

31. Mocorón Incident, 1957

32. Jordan Regime, 1957

33. France/Tunisia, 1957-58

34. Syria/Turkey Confrontation, 1957

35. Ifni, 1957-58

36. West Irian I, 1957

37. Abortive Coup in Indonesia, 1958

38. Iraq/Lebanon Upheaval, 1958

39. Taiwan Strait II, 1958

40. Central America/Cuba I, 1959

41. China/India Border I, 1959-60

42. Shatt-al-Arab I, 1959-60

43. Failed Assassination-Venezuela, 1960

44. Congo I-Katanga, 1960-62

45. Central America/Cuba II, 1960

46. Pathet Lao Offensive, 1961

47. Pushtunistan III, 1961-62

48. West Irian II, 1961-62

49. Goa II, 1961

50. Taiwan Strait III, 1962

51. Nam Tha, 1962

52. China/India Border II, 1962-63

53. Yemen War I, 1962-63

54. Malaysia Federation, 1963-65

55. Cuba/Venezuela, 1963

56. Cyprus I, 1963-64

57. Panama Flag, 1964

58. Ogaden I, 1964

59. Congo II, 1964

60. Yemen War II, 1964

61. Rann of Kutch, 1965

62. Dominican Intervention, 1965

63. Kashmir II, 1965-66

64. Rhodesia’s UDI, 1965-66

65. Yemen War IV, 1966-67

66. El Samu, 1966

67. Ché Guevara-Bolivia, 1967

68. Six Day War, 1967

69. Cyprus II, 1967

70. Pueblo, 1968

71. Karameh, 1968

72. Prague Spring, 1968

73. Essequibo I, 1968

74. Beirut Airport, 1968-69

75. Ussuri River, 1969

76. War of Attrition, 1969-70

77. Football War, 1969

78. Cairo Agreement-PLO, 1969

79. Black September, 1970

80. Conakry Raid, 1970

81. Bangladesh, 1971

82. Cod War I, 1973

83. October-Yom Kippur War, 1973-74

84. Oman/South Yemen, 1973-76

85. Cyprus III, 1974-75

86. Mayaguez, 1975

87. War in Angola, 1975-76

88. Moroccan March, 1975-76

89. Cod War II, 1975-76

90. Lebanon Civil War I, 1976

91. Operation Thrasher, 1976

92. Aegean Sea I, 1976

93. Nagomia Raid, 1976

94. Syria Mobilization, 1976

95. Shaba I, 1977

96. Mapai Seizure, 1977

97. Belize II, 1977

98. Egypt/Libya Clashes, 1977

99. Ogaden II, 1977-78

100. Rhodesia Raid, 1977-78

101. Chimoio-Tembue Raids, 1977-78

102. Beagle Channel I, 1977-78

103. Litani Operation, 1978

104. Cassinga Incident, 1978

105. Shaba II, 1978

106. Air Rhodesia Incident, 1978

107. Nicaragua Civil War II, 1978-79

108. Beagle Channel II, 1978-79

109. Fall of Amin, 1978-79

110. Sino/Vietnam War, 1978-79

111. North/South Yemen II, 1979

112. Afghanistan Invasion, 1979-80

113. Soviet Threat to Pakistan, 1979

114. Rhodesia Settlement, 1979-80

115. Columbia/Nicaragua, 1979-81

116. Raid on Gafsa, 1980

117. Solidarity, 1980-81

118. Onset Iran/Iraq War, 1980

119. Chad/Libya V, 1981

120. Ecuador/Peru Border III, 1981

121. Iraq Nuclear Reactor, 1981

122. Al-Biqa Missiles I, 1981

123. Coup Attempt in the Gambia,
1981-82

124. Operation Protea, 1981

125. Galtat Zemmour I, 1981

126. Khorramshahr, 1982

127. Falklands/Malvinas, 1982

128. War in Lebanon, 1982-83

129. Ogaden III, 1982

130. Lesotho Raid, 1982

131. Libya Threat to Sudan, 1983

132. Chad/Libya VI, 1983-84

133. Invasion of Grenada, 1983

134. Operation Askari, 1983-84

135. Basra-Kharg Island, 1984

136. Omdurman Bombing, 1984

137. Vietnam Incursion into Thailand,

138. Sino/Vietnam Clashes, 1984

139. Botswana Raid, 1985

140. Expulsion of Tunisians, 1985

141. Al-Biqa Missiles II, 1985-86

142. Egypt Air Hijacking, 1985

143. South Africa Raid on Lesotho,
1985-86

144. Capture of al-Faw, 1986

145. Chad/Libya VII, 1986

146. Gulf of Syrte II, 1986

147. South Africa Cross-Border Raid,
1986

148. Contras II, 1986

149. Chad/Libya VIII, 1986-87

150. Todghere Incident, 1987

151. Aegean Sea III, 1987

152. Mecca Pilgrimage, 1987

153. South Africa Intervention in Angola,
1987-88

154. Contras III, 1988

155. Iraq Recapture of al-Faw, 1988

156. Libyan Jets, 1988-89

157. Cambodia Peace Conference,
1989-90

158. Invasion of Panama, 1989-90

159. Kashmir III: India/Pakistan Nuclear
Crisis, 1990

160. Gulf War, 1990-91

161. Rwanda/Uganda, 1990-91

162. Liberia/Sierra Leone, 1991

163. Yugoslavia I: Croatia/Slovenia,

164. Bubiyan, 1991

165. Foreign Intervention in Zaire, 1991

166. Ecuador/Peru Border IV, 1991

167. Nagornyy-Karabakh, 1991-92

168. Yugoslavia II: Bosnia, 1992-95

169. Operation Accountability, 1993

170. Haiti Military Regime, 1994

171. Iraq Troop Deployment-Kuwait,
1994

APPENDIX B. Variable Definition and Coding

I. JUST CAUSE

A. Defense of the innocent against wrongful attack
1.) x1= “direct violent trigger”
2.) x2= “power discrepancy scale (trigger-target)”
3.) x3= “triggering entity (type)”

This principle implies determining the presence of a wrongful attack in an international crisis which would justify resort to intervening with military force. Given the prevailing norms of the international system during the era in question and the theoretical constructs of this paper (unitary rational actor model, focus on system stability), “wrongful attack” can best be described in terms of a forceful violation of sovereignty. This wrongful nature of a forceful violation of sovereignty may or may not be compounded by the character of the violating actor.

1.) Force was measured by the presence of a direct violent trigger in the crisis, x1= “direct violent trigger.” This variable was based on ICB variable BREAK (“breakpoint [trigger] to international crisis”) and was itself transformed into a dichotomous variable, with all BREAK values 1 through 7 (ranging from ‘verbal act’ to ‘nonviolent military act’) =0 (“no or indirect attack”) and 8 through 9 ('indirect violent act' and ‘violent act’)=1 (“direct attack”).

2.) The magnitude of the power discrepancy between the triggering entity and the target state was also considered, in a new power discrepancy scale x2= “power discrepancy scale (trigger-target).” This was based on the existing ICB variable POWDISSY (“power discrepancy”) ranking the power discrepancy between crisis adversaries based on factors such as GNP, geographic size, military expenditures, etc. The existing POWDISSY scale was assessed as a frequency distribution and then transformed into an ordinal scale consisting of five categories with six values each (with POWDISSY=0 remaining x2=0 “no discrepancy”, POWDISSY=1 through 6 becoming x2=1 “low discrepancy”, POWDISSY=7 through 12 becoming x2=2 “moderate low discrepancy”, etc.). The case summaries were then consulted for categorization of the power discrepancy between the crisis triggering actor and the intervention target state along the aforementioned ordinal scale.

3.) Additionally, the character of the triggering entity was taken into consideration, x3= “triggering entity (type).” This variable is based on the existing ICB variable TRIGENT (“triggering entity of crisis”), with TRIGENT =002 (U.S.) recoded into a null value of 0, TRIGENT = 995 (internal trigger) recoded into a value of 1, TRIGENT = 996+997 (non-state and multi-state actor, respectively) recoded into a value of 2, and TRIGENT = all other states recoded into a value of 3. A zero value for x3 is invalid for our analysis, a 1 value for x3 would arguably render military intervention unjust under a just war framework (without some other intervening variable reflecting human catastrophe, for example), a 2 value for x3 would increase justification for military intervention along the continuum, and a 3 value would most justify military intervention. This characterization is based on the assumption that the wrongful violation of sovereignty is heightened if committed by another state actor, itself based on the norms of the international system and the assumption of value in preserving system stability.

B. Reclaiming something wrongfully taken

1.) x4= “territory seized”

2.) x5= “property/persons seized (US)”

The principle of just cause for a resort to war is most often characterized (and possibly most easily understood) when that cause is a defense against wrongful attack. What this may reflect is a broadening of the concept of “defense” in its contemporary usage (Johnson). This expansion eliminates some of the distinctions about both the “spoils” and the brutality of that attack which classical just war theory provided for in the just cause principle. Approximations of the former (“the spoils”) are presented below.

1.) The obvious and most desired target of a wrongful attack, particularly in conceiving of that wrongfulness within the theoretical bounds of this paper, would be territory. Thus x4 “territory seized” was coded into the ICB dataset as a new variable to reflect the role that seizure of target state territory by the triggering actor played in each conflict which eventually drew some form of U.S. intervention. The values of x4 were coded as 0= no or minimal territory seized and 1= territory seized and were based largely on the case summaries as well as minimal outside sources. Again, caution was exercised in deciding that a justification of military intervention would not be sufficient if based only on the seizure of a minimal portion of territory. This coding could be considered conservative given the impact of the inviolability of borders on both 20^th century international law and the just war theory; any seizure of territory might justify a forceful response.

2.) Another clear and justifiable target for the just cause principle is the seizure of U.S. property or personnel in the conflict at hand by a crisis actor. This was measured again by a new independent variable coded into the ICB dataset based largely on the conflict summaries, x5= “property/persons seized (US)” This dichotomous variable is intended to measure whether the seizure of U.S. property (including substantial private assets, not just U.S. government property) or personnel (again, private citizens as well as official U.S. government personnel) in a theater of conflict was of a significant nature.

C. Punishment of evil

x6= “gravity of threat (trigger-target)”
x7= “dictatorial regime involved actor”

As noted above, the just cause principle is often mis-characterized as simply a rationale for applying military force against a state that has directly attacked by another state, what would be most closely described in I-A above. This characterization overlooks both the level of brutality associated with that attack and the level of brutality that may be present in a conflict lacking a clear violation of borders. This second oversight is critically relevant for just war thinking because of its conceptualization of sovereignty as worthwhile if (and only if) the state in question is functionally serving the social contract. In other words, for the just cause principle, punishment of evil through application of military might is justified in either case. Approximations of the level of evil present in a conflict are presented below.

It is important to note that for the purposes of this study—an inquiry into U.S. military intervention—these approximations of evil are (and indeed should be) U.S.-centric. The focus here is on perceptions of evil that would justify U.S. military intervention, and the perceivers after all are U.S. decision makers. Hence, the inclusion of sometimes difficult (and certainly contestable) notions like “dictatorial regime” and “human rights abuses.”

1.) One means of approximating the level of brutality or evil present in a conflict is captured in x6, “gravity of threat (trigger-target).” This variable is a modification of existing ICB variable GRAVCR (“gravity of threat”), and its values reflect the transformation of GRAVCR into a dummy variable, with 0=non-existence threat (GRAVCR= 0-4 and 7) and 1=existence threat (GRAVCR=5 and 6). The variable is thus advanced to measure whether the crisis behavior employed against the target state had as its primary design the destruction or elimination of that target state, generally reflective of evil intent in a 20^th century international context.

2.) A second, and admittedly U.S.-centric measure of the presence of evil in a conflict, is x7= “dictatorial regime involved actor.” This variable was newly added to the ICB dataset (coded largely from the case summaries), though its logic parallels that of the ICB variable REGIME contained in the actor-level dataset. x7 is also dichotomous in nature and reflects the presence of a dictatorially ruled state as a crisis actor in a conflict, 0=non-dictatorial regime and 1=dictatorial regime. The liberal democratic bias of including a dictatorship to reflect evil is acceptable in this application, considering that U.S. decision-makers, at least in their public positions, reflect this bias. This variable is further justified by the well-documented tendency of the U.S. to personalize conflicts in which dictators are involved, often demonizing these leaders and confirming the assumption here that dictatorships are viewed as inherently evil. Thus, perceived evil is arguably testable through x7 (though this is further complicated by the presence of U.S. sponsored dictators in certain cases, as well as what makes a dictator more broadly, which will be discussed further in the analysis section).

II. COMPETENT AUTHORITY

A. Authority by sovereign political authority

x8= “global organization authority”
x9= “regional organization authority”
x10= “target state authority”

Based on a fusion of just war theory and positive international law, three legitimate sources of authority for military intervention by one state into a conflict can be discerned—an international governing organization or organ thereof (in this case, the United Nations); a regional governing organization or organ thereof (in this case, the Organization of American States, Organization for African Unity, etc.); or a sovereign target state itself. While applying the concept of sovereignty to global and regional organizations, as done here, may be troubling for some, it need not be. Sovereignty used in a just war sense really refers to any politically legitimate actor or body (Johnson, 1999) rather than the strict legal interpretation of the term in which sovereignty can only be embodied in nation-states. The wider understanding of the term used in just war theory[20] renders it entirely consistent with the position of leading intervention theorists such as Bull, Luard, and Hoffman. These and other intervention scholars have found that the world community largely accepts the UN and regional organizations as "sovereign" sources of legitimization for military intervention (Bull, 1984), along with sovereignty as classically defined; that is, a sovereign state facing attack.

1.) Two components make up x8= global organization authority", a dichotomous variable advanced to depict the presence or absence of global organization authority for military intervention. The first is whether a global organization specifically acted to sanction the military intervention, based on particular values of the ICB variable GLOBACTM (“content of global organization involvement”). For x10, all values of GLOBACTM with the exception of 5 (“condemnation”), 6 (“call for action by adversaries”) and 11 (“emergency military forces”) reflected a lack of IGO authorizing action, with GLOBACTM=5, 6, or 11 reflecting IGO authorizing action. These latter values were the only actions by an international governing body deemed decisive and authoritative enough to consider a sanction of military intervention by a third party state.

The second component of the IGO authority variable x8 describes the source of global organization involvement. Accordingly, x10 relies on the existing ICB variable SOGLACT to address the question of which party or parties first approached the global authority during a crisis. There are several relevant values on the scale for this analysis. Values 2 (“crisis actor”) and 6 (“initiated by global organization”) would represent the most profound authorizations for military intervention; conversely, values 3 (“third party”) and 4 (“United States”) would reflect violations of the jus ad bellum law on competent authority grounds. In combination, these two components of x10 provide a robust measure of global authority, by accounting for both the type and source of global authority for a military intervention. Values of GLOBACTM= 5, 6, or 11 plus SOGLACT values 2 or 6 translate into x8 =1, "global organization authority," with all other values for x8= "no global organization authority."

2.) Two component factors were also used in constructing x9= "regional organization authority." The first is whether a regional organization specifically acted to sanction the military intervention, based on particular values of the ICB variable REGACTMB (“content of regional/security organization involvement”). For x9, all values of REGACTMB with the exception of 5 (“condemnation”), 6 (“call for action”), or 11 (“emergency military force”) reflected an absence of RGO authorizing action, while REGACTMB=5, 6, or 11 were considered representative of RGO authorizing action. The same rationale provided for x8 applies here.

The second component of the RGO authorization variable is the source of regional/security organization involvement. This was measured using an existing ICB variable, SORACT, to address the question of which party or parties first approached the regional governing authority during a crisis. There are several values on this scale of interest in this analysis. Again, values 2 (“crisis actor”) and 6 (“initiated by regional organization”) would represent the most profound authorizations for military intervention; conversely, values 3 (“third party”) and 4 (“United States”) would reflect violations of the jus ad bellum law on competent authority grounds. In combination, these two components of x9 provide a robust measure of regional authority, by accounting for both the type and source of regional authority for a military intervention. Values of REGACTMB= 5, 6, or 11 plus SORACT values 2 or 6 translate into x11= "regional organization authority," with all other values for x9= "no regional organization authority."

3.) Finally, the variable x10= "target state authority” measures the type of authorization for military intervention from a sovereign state that is the target in an international crisis. For the purposes of this analysis, target state authorization is sufficiently represented either in the form of an invitation or request directly to the U.S. government for military intervention, or through invitation or request indirectly to a regional or international governing body with the ability to sanction a military intervention.

III. Right Intention

The third principle of the law of jus ad bellum, right intention, has historically been considered both in a negative (that is, what must be absent to signal right intention by the party considering a resort to war) and a positive (what must be present to signal right intention by the party considering a resort to war) connotation. Given the empirical nature of this analysis, only the positive connotation of right intention will be considered. The difficulties in finding proximate measures describing the absence of interest in territorial acquisition, intimidation, coercion, or the practice of cruelty/hatred are too significant to be overlooked. In the positive sense, two 'right intention' variables are presented which reflect the promotion of peace and restoration of justice, oft-cited examples of the positive conception of right intention.

A. Positive Conception

x11= “U.S. activity and pace of abatement”
x12= “formality of outcome”

1.) Independent variable x11 (U.S. activity and pace of abatement) measures the influence of U.S. activity on the direction of the crisis. X11 is a dichotomized version of an existing ICB variable measuring the effect of the U.S. activity in the crisis on its abatement; 0 = "no U.S. contribution to abatement" and consists of ICB values 2 (“delayed termination”) and 3 (“not effective”), while 1 ="U.S. contribution to abatement" and is a recoding of ICB value 4 (“contributed to termination”). Variables measuring right intention are by necessity retrospective and require inference about intent from behavior after the latter has already occurred.

2.) This variable (x12= formality of outcome) measures the formal outcome of the conflict, patterned after existing ICB variable FOROUT (“form of outcome”), with an ordinal scale running from 0 = "no formal outcome" to 3 = "formal outcome." The formality measured by this variable approximates a more stable result for the crisis outcome, thereby meeting our earlier theoretical prerequisite for system stability and conferring ‘right intention’ on the U.S. intervention.

Three control variables are also introduced into the logistic regression model for Stage 2 of my analysis; that is, for the purposes of testing the strength of my jus ad bellum findings with the other three explanatory frameworks (regional hegemony, structural realism, and ideological conflict) introduced. These variables are ctrl1—“geographic location of crisis”, ctrl2—“U.S. ally involved actor”, and ctrl3—“USSR involved actor”. All three control variables are relatively self-explanatory, in that they reflect the contextual setting of the case of U.S. intervention and are used to measure the impact (if any) of these contexts on the just war variables. Ctrl1 (“geographic location of crisis”) is a previously existing ICB variable, which ctrl2 and ctrl3 are new variables introduced into the dataset, coded dichotomously for the presence or absence of either a U.S. ally or the USSR, and based largely on the case summaries provided.

[1] Some would say including Clausewitz; Phillips for one implies that Clausewitz understood war in the Kantian sense, that is both as an idealized, abstracted concept and as an empirical reality. By this reading, the former understanding explains Clausewitz’s pronouncements on the need to wage war absolutely; the latter to his pragmatic discussion of war’s limits.

[2] Gelb and Betts (1979) offer nine such framing categories in their treatment of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam

[3] Conceptually, Hoffman’s notion of (regional) hegemonic power could be considered a sub-set of structural realism, but nonetheless his discussion here distinctly lays out these three frameworks as benchmarks for thinking about intervention since the Second World War.

[4] Young’s presupposition of a third party’s interest in facilitating crisis abatement is in itself a testimony to the implicit hold of JWT on scholars of conflict intervention.

[5] I include what I am calling the “immediate post-Cold War era”—1989-94—to lend a bit of temporal conservatism to the analysis, in recognition of the fact that shifts in perceptions among U.S. policymakers are exceedingly constrained by time factors. It is safe to assume that thinking among U.S. policymakers concerning intervention did not dramatically change the day the Berlin Wall fell; it logically follows that empirically testing intervention decisions for the presence or absence of a “just war” framework in the Cold War era should include at a minimum this amount of lag time.

[6] While the intent of this paper directs the analysis to the questions of jus ad bellum, the impact of jus in bello on the prosecution of modern war and the evolution of international legal conventions governing its conduct should not be overlooked.

[7] Though almost certainly the jus ad bellum has been misused over its long history, this hardly negates the viability of the law as a precautionary framework for moral choices about war.

[8] Two other important just war criteria exist; however discrimination (limiting harm to civilians and non-combatants) and proportionality of means (force used in combat) are mainly jus in bello principles and hence are outside the bounds of this discussion.

[9] And, according to Johnson and Walzer, in international positive law as well.

[10] Heated debate over whether this sovereign political authority can be found in a non-state actor (that is, an IGO or RGO) exists; for unrelated analytical purposes described in the “Methodology” section I will assume that it can.

[11] Particularly over preemptive first strikes, involvement in wars of national liberation or secessionist movements, and the role of non-state bodies (IGOs) in prosecuting a just war.

[12] Walzer provides detailed case studies throughout history up to and including present day conflicts to illustrate just war theory in practice.

[13] Haass, citing George (1980) rejects the notion that “national interest” can be a valid test for intervention, relegating it only to a justifying role due to its elasticity as a concept and its too-frequent invocation. This is really a critique not of the concept, but of its application (or mis-application). I assert that a more robust conception of national interest, as offered in the JWT—incorporating the preservation of individual rights as a primary goal—helps us avoid this problem.

[14] Out of an obvious reluctance to provoke a direct showdown that could lead to full-scale, possibly nuclear, war.

[15] It should be stressed again that this analysis does not allow testing for the inverse scenario; that is, I cannot address the significant question of whether ideologically motivated interventions were impacted one way or another by justice considerations in any of the models I provide herein. Though leaving this question unanswered does not limit this analysis of just war theory (as it pertains to the strength of ideologically oriented explanations), it remains analytically important nonetheless.

[16] This case selection criteria admittedly exposes the research to a potential case selection problem; namely, if international legal or moral imperatives are in fact active in the cases selected, it could be those factors dictating the U.S. involvement (or non-involvement), and by extension, the U.S. military involvement (or non-military involvement). This can be overcome by reminding oneself that the actual dependent variable being considered here is whether the U.S. used military force in any cases in which it became involved (an agency question), not what external considerations may have precipitated U.S. involvement in the first place, or a particular type of U.S. involvement (a structure question). Though this latter question deserves full consideration, it is outside the bounds of this paper.

[17] Cases with an ICB value=1 (“U.S. not active”) were dropped from this analysis, per my earlier case selection criteria.

[18] Given that the hypotheses as formulated are directional in nature, in exploring the possibility that U.S. military intervention in a crisis will increase with the presence of just war conditions in that crisis, significance levels are based on a one-tailed test.

[19] Though almost certainly regional considerations would have achieved significance in an analysis of 19^th and early 20^th century U.S. interventions.

[20] Which, after all, has roots predating the rise of the modern conception of the nation-state.

U.S. Military Intervention in Crisis 1945-1994:
An Empirical Inquiry of Just War Theory

Michael J. Butler
Department of Political Science

Coefficient

APPENDIX B. Variable Definition and Coding