THE U.S. POW EXPERIENCE SINCE WORLD WAR II

by

Willam H. Forman, Jr

I. Introduction

A Russian general asked General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower why

German prisoners of war were treated so well by Allied forces during World War II. General Eisenhower replied that “in the first place my country was required to do so by the terms of the Geneva Convention. In the second place, the Germans had some thousands of American and British prisoners and I did not want to give Hitler the excuse or justification for treating our prisoners more harshly than he was already doing.”¹

Reciprocity is an underlying principle in the enforcement of POW treatment standards. A government’s violation of such standards destroys its moral position in demanding humane treatment for the members of its own armed forces who are captured during hostilities. In other words, a government’s deliberate violations of POW treatment standards put its own soldiers, sailors, and airmen in danger. General Eisenhower obviously understood the principle of reciprocity.

Following the war in a report to Congress, General Eisenhower stated that the promise of treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1929 caused a considerable number of Germans to surrender. If the Germans had continued to fight, a much greater number of American soldiers would have been killed.² The promise to provide POW treatment in accordance with the Geneva POW Convention of 1929 was, therefore, an indirect means of force protection.

The International Committee of the Red Cross began to rewrite the Geneva POW Convention in 1945. Representatives of sixty nations drew upon their experiences during World War II in drafting the revisions. Their work was completed in 1949. The United States Senate approved the revised Geneva POW Convention in July 1955. The Convention’s provisions went into effect for the nation’s armed forces during the following year.³ According to the U.S. Constitution, the Geneva POW Convention is “the supreme law of the land.”⁴

The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001, will be indelibly etched in the eye of memory of anyone who watched the events of that day unfold. It was the first time that a city in the continental United States has been attacked by a foreign entity since the War of 1812. President George W. Bush on September 18, 2001, signed Senate Joint Resolution 23 authorizing the use of military force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks.⁵ On February 7, 2002, President Bush decided that the 1949 Geneva POW Convention applies to members of the Taliban captured in Afghanistan. Prisoner of war status, however, does not apply to them.⁶ it has been reported that 300 members of the Taliban and al-Qaida have been transported to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.⁷ They have been confined there in six by eight foot wire cages.⁸

The U.S. government voted against the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.) Statute at Rome in 1998. On December 31, 2000, the government reversed its position and a representative signed the Rome Treaty on the I.C.C.⁹ The Treaty specified that the I.C.C. was to be established after the sixtieth nation’s ratification of its provisions. A ceremony commemorating the sixtieth nation’s ratification was recently held at the United Nations.¹⁰ The United States formally withdrew its support from the treaty on May 6, 2002.¹¹

The U.S. earlier this year suspended a grant of $40 million in aid to Serbia and Montenegro, which recently replaced Yugoslavia on the world’s maps.¹² The reasons given for the suspension of financial assistance were that Serbia and Montenegro were not adequately cooperating with the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 – hereinafter referred to as the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. The two republics, however, recently passed a law providing for the extradition of persons indicted for war crimes to the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia at the Hague, Netherlands. Philip T. Reeker, U.S. State Department representative, stated that the law must be “followed through with urgent and effective action.”¹³

II. POW Treatment Standards

Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva POW Convention¹⁴ defines its subject as any captured member of a regular army, a militia or a volunteer corps that meet the following conditions:

1. The member’s unit is “commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,”

2. The unit is fighting under a “fixed sign recognizable at a distance,”

3. The unit carries their arms openly and

4. The unit conducts its military operations “in accordance with the laws and customs of war.¹⁵

Article 5 of the Convention adds the following: “Should any doubt arise as

to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”

When forces of opposing powers are engaged in armed conflict, a neutral

state may be agreed upon to serve as the protecting power according to Article 8. This role may also be assumed by the International Committee of the Red Cross.¹⁶ The protecting power has the responsibility to see that the detaining powers’ observe the Geneva POW Convention with respect to treatment of war prisoners.

Article 16 states that prisoners of war are to be treated humanely without regard to race, color, creed, or belief.¹⁷ They are to be moved out of the combat zone as soon as possible after capture.¹⁸ Moreover, the individual prisoner is obliged to give only his name, rank, serial number, and date of birth.¹⁹

Article 25 declares that war prisoners are to be housed in billets similar to those that shelter the detaining power’s personnel. Sufficient food should be distributed to maintain the prisoners in good health.²⁰ Clothing and footgear appropriate to the climate is to be issued and adequate medical care should be provided.²¹

Provision is made for the detaining power to compel prisoners of war to work. However, this labor is not to be for a military purpose. Nor should prisoners be forced to undertake work that is humiliating, dangerous, or detrimental to health. Non-commissioned Officers may be required only to perform work of a supervisory nature. Officers may not be forced to work.²²

Prisoners of war are subject to the detaining power’s orders, regulations, and laws.²³ A prisoner caught attempting to escape may only be administered disciplinary punishment if there has been no violence to life or limb.²⁴

The detaining power is to post the Geneva Convention in the prisoners’ language. It should be displayed in the place accessible for all to read.²⁵ Complaints alleging violations of the Geneva Convention are to be addressed to the detaining power, or to the protecting power.²⁶

Prisoners of war are not to be mutilated, tortured, or degraded.²⁷ The individual prisoner also has the right to practice his religion.²⁸ Prisoners of war have been mistreated and murdered since the beginning of recorded history.²⁹ Such treatment improved with the spread of Christianity.³⁰ A review of the U.S. experience since 1941 will illustrate the problems related to POW treatment standard enforcement.

III. WORLD WAR II: 1941-1945

The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of

1929 was in effect during World War II. Article 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW

Convention restated the historic customary rule as to the treatment of war prisoners: “they shall at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, from insults, and from public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them are forbidden.” Article 3 added that “prisoners of war are entitled to respect for their persons and honor. Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex.”

A representative of the United States signed the Convention on July 27, 1929. Congress ratified the treaty on February 4, 1932. The Convention was also signed by Japan’s representative on July 27, 1929. The Japanese government, however, never ratified the Convention³⁰ even though it had previously ratified the Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907.³¹ Article 4 of the Annex stated that all POW’s “must be treated humanely.” During February 1942, the Japanese government notified the International Red Cross that its forces would apply the Geneva POW Convention as much as possible to captured members of enemy armed forces and civilian internees.³² Japanese forces in the Pacific captured a total of 28,570 U.S. Army war prisoners during World War II. Of this number, 11,530 died while in captivity for a return rate of 59.6 percent.³³

Captain William E. Dyess, Jr. and nine other U.S. POW’s escaped from the Davao Penal Colony in the Philippines during April 1943. They walked away from an unguarded agricultural detail in the jungle. After several days in the jungle, the escaped prisoners came into contact with Filipino guerrilla forces. With their assistance, Captain Dyess was evacuated by submarine to Australia.³⁴ There, for the first time, the story was told to members of General Douglas MacArthur’s staff about Japanese atrocities in the treatment of U.S. and Filipino war prisoners.³⁵ The story of Captain Dyess and his comrades was finally released to the press on January 28, 1944. The American public was outraged. Secretary of State Cordull Hull warned Japanese officials through diplomatic channels that those responsible for the atrocities would be held accountable for their war crimes.³⁶

International law concerning the humane treatment of POW’s did not go unenforced after World War II. At General MacArthur’s request, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff during the War issued a directive ordering the investigation and detention of all Japanese suspected of war crimes. The directive also authorized the establishment of special international courts to try the suspects and procedural rules were adopted.³⁷

Pursuant to this directive, General MacArthur established two separate offices for the prosecution of suspected war criminals. The International Prosecution Section was established to try the principal Japanese war crime suspects, including General Hideki Tojo. Their trials were conducted before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The Tribunal consisted of judges from eleven Allied nations and its cases were tried in Tokyo.³⁸

The War Crimes Branch of the General Headquarters of the U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific was also established to try Japanese suspected of war crimes who were not prosecuted before the International Military Tribunal. Offices of the War Crimes Branch were established in Manila and Yokohama, Japan. Military commissions consisting of U.S. Army officers were appointed by General MacArthur to try these cases.³⁹ Such commissions were authorized by Article 15 of the U.S. Articles of War of 1920.

The trial by military commission of the Japanese general in command during the Bataan Death March began on January 3, 1946. Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma was accused of forty-seven specific war crimes, including the numerous atrocities committed by Japanese troops during the Death March. The commission found Homma guilty of having committed war crimes on February 11, 1946. He was sentenced to death.⁴⁰ General MacArthur approved the findings and sentence on March 21, 1946.⁴¹ In his final review of the Homma case, General MacArthur wrote that “soldiers of an army invariably reflect the attitude of their general. The leader is the essence. Isolated cases of rapine may well be exceptional, but widespread and continuing abuse can only be a fixed responsibility of highest field authority.⁴² During the early morning of April 3, 1946, Homma was shot to death by a firing squad in the same courtyard where General Tomoyuki Yamashita was earlier executed for war crimes.⁴³

Japanese officers during World War II followed the Code of Bushido—the “way of the warrior.” The Code did not put any value on a strong person’s helping a weakened person. The Bushido Code did not contain any tradition of chivalry, mercy, or compassion. Cruelty in the performance of duty was encouraged. As a result, Japanese officers and men were often unfeeling in their behavior toward POW’s. They held in contempt Japanese who surrendered. They held in even stronger contempt enemy soldiers who surrendered.⁴⁴

Some might have excused Homma because of his different cultural values. Such cultural relativism obviously did not impress the members of the military commission that tried him, for, as mentioned, he was found guilty of having committed war crimes, sentenced to death, and executed.

While awaiting execution, Homma wrote letters to his family accusing the United States of victor’s justice. He stated that it was a “bold lie” to say that the U.S. is a “fair country.” He mentioned the hundreds of thousands of Japanese killed during the U.S. air campaign. His conclusion was that “there is no such thing as justice in international relations in this universe.”⁴⁵

Treatment of U.S. prisoners of war in Germany was uneven. Such treatment worsened toward the end of the war. However, the basic standard for determining whether a nation has observed the law of war as to the treatment of POW’s is obviously the percentage of prisoners who return. During the Second World War, 95,495 members of the U.S. Army were captured in the Atlantic area by German and other Axis forces. Of these, 94,373—over ninety-eight percent—lived to return home^,46 In addition, the American Red Cross’ report stated that German officials never did stop the flow of Red Cross relief supplies to U.S. prisoners. This practice, the report continued, was mainly due to the U.S. Army’s following the 1929 Geneva POW Convention in its treatment of German prisoners.⁴⁷ Treatment of U.S. war prisoners in Germany obviously could have been much worse.⁴⁸ The Nazis killed more than six million people in their concentration camps.⁴⁹ A regime that was capable of such crimes against humanity could also have formulated and executed a policy of torture and murder in its camps for U.S. prisoners of war.

There was a continuous threat from German civilians to allied airmen who bailed out over Germany.⁵⁰ This threat resulted from the Nazi directive issued by Rudolph Hess ordering German civilians “to arrest or liquidate all bailed-out Allied fliers.⁵¹ This Nazi policy violated Article 2 of the 1929 Geneva POW Convention. After V-E Day, several German civilians were tried by U. S. Military Commissions for murdering U.S. airmen. Some were convicted, sentenced to death, and executed.⁵²

IV. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

Under the cover of cloudy visibility-limiting weather, North Korean forces

struck across the 38^th parallel into South Korea on June 25, 1950.⁵³ General MacArthur was appointed to command the U. N. forces resisting Communist aggression. Soon afterward, he issued an order that the forces under his command would follow the provisions of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.⁵⁴ The United States Senate did not ratify the conventions until 1955—two years after the Korean War ended.

The government of the People' Republic of Korea (North Korea) also announced that it would follow the 1949 Geneva Convention on treatment of prisoners of war. On July 16, 1952, the foreign minister of Communist China stated that his government would recognize the 1949 Geneva POW Convention subject to certain reservations officially referred to as their “Lenient Policy”.⁵⁵ The policy was another name for brainwashing.⁵⁶

The Korean War added another chapter to mistreatment of U.S. POW’s by the enemy. The North Korean and Chinese captors added a sinister new element to war prisoner maltreatment—brainwashing.⁵⁷

War prisoner treatment was summarized in Judge George W. Latimer’s opinion in the court-martial appeal titled U.S. v. Olson.⁵⁸ For in his words, “American prisoners were subjected by the Chinese to contrived malnutrition, indescribable filth, indignities, and in some instances, to physical brutality. They were denied adequate food and their medical care was just short of nonexistent.”⁵⁹

On July 27, 1953, the armistice agreement ending the Korean War was signed.⁶⁰ North Korea was not occupied by U.N. forces. Chinese and North Koreans suspected of POW murder and mistreatment were never tried.

V. THE VIETNAM WAR, 1961-1973

Vietnam was occupied by Japanese forces during World War II. As a

result, aircraft of the U.S. Army Air Force flew numerous missions against targets in Vietnam during that conflict. Targets attacked were located at Hanoi, Haiphong, Saigong, Tourance (Da Nang) and Cam Ranh Bay. Japan surrendered in 1945. Sixteen years later, U.S. Air Force air crews returned to the area to assist the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in its struggle against the Viet Cong and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).⁶¹

During February 1965, the U.S. Air Force launched its first air strike against North Vietnam.⁶² As the raids continued, some of the pilots did not return to their bases. They were either killed or captured.

The North Vietnamese government signed the 1949 Geneva POW Convention in 1957.⁶³ As U.S. war prisoners increased in number, the U.S. government in late 1965 began its efforts to ensure that North Vietnam observed the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention. The North Vietnamese government, however, announced that U.S. prisoners were not entitled to prisoner to war treatment. U. S. airmen were instead criminals because there had not been a formal declaration of war between North Vietnam and the United States.⁶⁴ Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva POW Convention, however, does not require a formal declaration of war for members of a nation’s armed forces to have the right to prisoner of war treatment.

U. S. air strikes against North Vietnam increased during the summer of 1966. The North Vietnamese government at that time threatened to try sixty U.S. war prisoners for war crimes. In addition, fifty-two U.S. prisoners were paraded through the streets of Hanoi while an agitated, screaming mob hit and threw stones at them in violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. The war crimes trials were never held. The threat of immediate and certain U.S. retaliation apparently changed the minds of the North Vietnamese Communist officials.⁶⁵

On July 3, 1969, the North Vietnamese announced that they were releasing three U.S. Prisoners: Lieutenant Robert Frishman, USN; Captain Wesley L. Rumble, USAF; and Seaman Douglas Hegdahl, USN. On September 3, 1969, Lieutenant Frishman and Seaman Hegdahl held a press conference. They confirmed what had been suspected. Another chapter in the mistreatment of U.S. war prisoners was being written.⁶⁶

Captain M. Neal Jones’ aircraft was shot down over Hanoi on June 29,1966, during the early afternoon. When the plane was hit, he parachuted to the ground. He was later captured, beaten, and paraded through Hanoi’s streets before a jeering mob of people. His treatment during captivity included beatings, solitary confinement, minimal or no medical care, and an inadequate diet. Cells at the Hanoi Hilton were seven by nine feet.⁶⁷ During a lecture at Tulane University on February 26, 1991, he stated that there were Cubans at the prison who were sent to instruct the North Vietnamese in torture techniques. Now retired from the Air Force, Colonel Jones mentioned that his weight while in captivity dropped from 230 to 130 pounds. He added that his treatment improved after negotiations began during the fall of 1972 to end U.S. participation in the war. He was released on February 12, 1973.⁶⁸

The testimony of Col. Jones and other airmen revealed that the North Vietnamese regularly subjected them to the described mistreatment.⁶⁹ Such atrocities obviously violated provisions of the 1949 Geneva POW Convention.

The aircraft flown by Commander James B. Stockdale, USN, was shot down over North Vietnam on September 9, 1965.⁷⁰ He was captured and also imprisoned at the Hoa Lo Prison (Hanoi Hilton). He, too, endured a life of inadequate medical attention, insufficient food, and torture, all of which clearly violated the Geneva Convention of 1949.⁷¹

Commander Stockdale described his maltreatment in a coded letter to his wife that was received by Commander Robert Boroughs, USN. The letter was delivered to him at the Pentagon during January, 1967.⁷² The information about clear and continuous violations of the Geneva Convention that was known by Commander Boroughs was not, however, released to the United States citizenry.

Lyndon B. Johnson was president during the time of 1963 until 1969. His only mention of the U.S. POW’s in his memoirs was in connection with his visit with Pope Paul VI at the Vatican during December 1967. He asked the Pope to do anything that he could do to obtain information from the North Vietnamese about the U.S. POW’s or to have them released.⁷³

Robert S. McNamara served as Secretary of Defense during the Johnson administration until 1968. He did not mention the sufferings of the U.S. POW’s in his memoirs of the Vietnam War.⁷⁴

Dean Rusk served as Secretary of State during the Johnson administration. Like Robert McNamara, he did not mention the suffering of the U.S. POW’s in his memoirs of the Vietnam War. He did write, however, that the Johnson administration did not wish to cause the American people to become angered by the events of the Vietnam War.⁷⁵ Thus, the intelligence received by Commander Boroughs about atrocities committed by North Vietnamese against Commander Stockdale and other U.S. war prisoners was deliberately withheld from the American people by the leading members of the Johnson administration.

The first photographs of the U.S. POW’s in North Vietnam appeared in Life, April 7, 1967. Captain Jones’ picture was among those shown.⁷⁶ In an article accompanying the photographs, Lee Lockwood stated that North Vietnamese officials only permitted him to see Lieutenant Commander Richard A. Stratton, USN, briefly. He was denied access to the other U.S. POW’s. The North Vietnamese, however, took photographs of them with Lee Lockwood’s camera. Commander Stratton put on a bowing performance in front of Lockwood that lasted for about four minutes.⁷⁷ Lockwood’s article was also accompanied by a statement from U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. He declared that the North Vietnamese had not allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other neutral agency to visit the U.S. POW’s as is required by the Geneva Convention.⁷⁸

Colonel Howard S. Levie, USA, Ret., reported on the maltreatment of U.S. and other war prisoners in 1968.⁷⁹ Louis R. Stockstill’s cover article on the sufferings of U.S. POW’s in North Vietnam in Air Force magazine was published during the following year.⁸⁰ An editorial in the same publication strongly condemned North Vietnamese officials for violating the Geneva Convention.⁸¹ Another cover article on the plight of U.S. POWs appeared in the June 1970 issue of Air Force magazine.⁸² The accompanying editorial stated that “War Prisoners Have Human Rights Too.”⁸³ Time published a similar cover article on the subject on December 7, 1970.⁸⁴

At the Eighth Military History Symposium at the United States Air Force Academy in 1978, Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, Ret., stated that a tribunal consisting of United States and Allied jurists should have been established in Saigon during the war. Evidence of the North Vietnamese atrocities against U.S. POW’s should have been systematically presented to the tribunal. The proceedings of the tribunal would have been open to the public and the media.⁸⁵ Proceedings before an already established international criminal court would also have exposed the barbarous treatment of U.S. POW’s by North Vietnamese officials. Vice Admiral Stockdale in the book written with his wife, Sybil, showed how the North Vietnamese leadership feared adverse publicity. In the book he described his meeting with Nguyen Khac Vien during 1966. Vien had led the Viet Minh propaganda effort in France during 1953 and 1954. The French garrison at Dien Bien Phu surrendered in 1954. The Geneva Agreements were signed later in the year. The Agreements divided Vietnam at the 17^th Parallel. Finally, in that year, the last French troops departed from Hanoi and the Viet Minh leadership became the government of North Vietnam.⁸⁶

During his discussion with Admiral Stockdale, Vien stated the following: “Our country has no capability to defeat you on the battlefield. But, war is not decided by weapons so much as by national will. Once the American people understand this war, they will have no interest in pursuing it. They will be made to understand this. We will win this war on the streets of New York.”⁸⁷ We will never know, of course, what the North Vietnamese would have done if information about their violations of the Geneva POW Convention in their treatment of Captain Jones and his fellow U.S. Pow’s had been released to the media by the U.S. government beginning in January 1967.

A U.S. Congressional fact finding committee in 1970 discovered the “tiger cages of Con Son”. These cells were constructed by the French after a student revolt in 1907. They were hidden within the Con Son Island’s prison complex. The cages were used by the South Vietnamese government to confine political prisoners.⁸⁸

The cages were five by eight-foot rooms built of stone. Bars had been placed across the top of each room. Two barracks-like buildings stood above the cages. About 400 political prisoners were confined in the cages when they were discovered in 1970. Three to five persons were crowded into each cage. Half of the prisoners were women.⁸⁹

A member of the fact finding committee, present United States Senator Thomas R. Harkin, took photographs of the cages. The photographs were later published in Life magazine. The prisoners complained about frequent beatings and inadequate food, water, and medical attention. Thomas Harkin, the fact findings committee’s only staff member, resigned from his office in protest. He stated that the committee had suppressed its findings about the inhumane treatment of South Vietnam’s political prisoners. He urged the U.S. government to put forth maximum pressure on the South Vietnamese government to improve its prison conditions. Such pressure, he added, would have strengthened the U.S. government’s position when its officials called for free inspections of North Vietnam’s prisons for United States POW’s and humane treatment for them.⁹⁰

On January 23, 1973, an agreement was reached in Paris to end U.S. participation in the Vietnam War. The agreement specified that the U.S. prisoners of war were to be released as the nation’s forces withdrew from Vietnam. Nearly 600 U.S. war prisoners were soon released.⁹¹

VI. PERSIAN GULF WAR, 1991

It was the realization of a pilot’s nightmare. While flying a mission over Baghdad during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U. S. Air Force Major Jeffrey S. Tice’s F-16 was hit by shrapnel from an exploding missile warhead. He survived by parachuting to the ground. He later described the next forty-five days as a time spent in hell. During Iraqi interrogations, he was beaten with hard rubber clubs that left bruises over his entire body. His torturers dislocated his jaw and broke his eardrum. Electric wires were wrapped around his ears and chin, resulting in his teeth being chipped. In addition, he was kept confined in a six by nine foot cell. Major Tice was not fed adequately while in captivity, which caused him to lose twenty-nine pounds.⁹²

U.S. Army Major Rhonda L. Cornum was in a Black Hawk helicopter that was shot down during the Persian Gulf War while on a rescue mission. She was dragged from the aircraft and kicked by her Iraqi captors. During her subsequent captivity, Major Cornum was sexually assaulted.⁹³ Major Cornum and U.S. Army Specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy were the first U.S. women POW’s since nurses were captured by Japanese forces on Corregidor in 1942.⁹⁴

Iraq is a signatory to the 1949 Geneva POW Convention, the current international treaty on the subject. Not all Iraqis have treated POW’s inhumanely as they did during the Persian Gulf War. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, several Israeli aircraft were shot down while flying over Iraq. The captured Israeli air crew members were in general treated humanely by their Iraqi captors.⁹⁵

VII. SOMALIA, 1993

U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer Michael J. Durant’s helicopter was shot down during October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, during the peacekeeping operation. He was surrounded by an angry mob, had dirt thrown in his face, and was hit several times on the head with a cane or club. He was held captive for eleven days before being released.⁹⁶ Somalia, like virtually every other country in the world, is a signatory to the 1949 Geneva Convention. Thus, POW treatment standards applied to the peacekeeping operation there. CWO Durant’s treatment obviously violated the 1949 Geneva POW Convention.

VIII CONCLUSION

In summary, POW’s have been mistreated and murdered since the beginning of recorded history. Enforcement of the international law of war prohibiting such acts has been varied. After World War II, as mentioned, Homma was tried by a U.S. Army Military Commission because of his command responsibility for the Bataan Death March and other war crimes. He was found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed. Other war criminals were tried, convicted, and sentenced by international criminal courts: the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg, Germany and Tokyo, Japan. However, after the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War, no one suspected of violating POW treatment standards was tried.

A person accused of such violations should be given the choice of facing trial or remaining in his own nation as an international fugitive. Those persons would no longer have any need for passports and airline tickets for foreign travel.

Finally, in my opinion, there are six points that need to be emphasized from the study of history of enforcement of POW treatment standards:

1. Reciprocity – as General Eisenhower stated, do not give the enemy an excuse for justification for mistreating and murdering your forces’ members, who have been captured, by violating the Geneva POW Convention;

2. Indirect force protection – again as General Eisenhower wrote, your observing the law of war concerning POW’s will serve as an inducement for enemy soldiers to surrender;

3. In accordance with Senator Harkin’s protest, your position on humane POW treatment will be weakened by your ally’s not observing the law of war on this subject;

4. As Article 5 of the 1949 Geneva POW Convention states, prisoner of war status is to be determined by a competent tribunal;

5. Be consistent – do not put members of the enemy’s armed forces in six by eight foot wire cages after your government condemned the confinement of U.S. prisoners of war in seven by nine foot cells by North Vietnamese Communist officials during the Vietnam War and

NOTES

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), p. 469.

²Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (New York: Scarborough House, 1992), p.256.

³Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-151, Lecture of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Washington, D.C. Department of the Army, 1958), p.1.

⁴Art. VI.

⁵”War on Terrorists – The Legal Foundation,” Air Force Magazine (November 2001), p.16.

⁶Katharine Q. Seelye, “Bush Now Decides Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives,” The New York Times, February 8, 2002, p. A1.

⁷Andres Leighton, “Detainees Want to Know Their Fate,” The Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA) March 3, 2002, p.A-19.

⁸Katharine Q. Seelye, “Handling of Captives Defended,” The Times-Picayune, January 17, 2002, p. A-5.

⁹”Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,” Sean D. Murphy, editor, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 387-421 at 397-400.

¹⁰Alexander A.C. Gerry, “Focus” in ROA National Security Report, The Officer (January/February 2002), p. 59.

¹¹The full title is “Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” Articles in this section of the article are from this Convention.

¹²Art. 9.

¹³Art. 16.

¹⁴Art. 19.

¹⁵Art. 17.

¹⁶Art. 26.

¹⁷Art. 27.

¹⁸Articles 49-57.

¹⁹Art. 82.

²⁰Art. 93.

²¹Art. 41.

²²Art. 78.

²³Articles 13, 17, and 87.

²⁴Art. 34.

²⁵Richard Garrett, P.O.W. The Uncivil Face of War (Devon” David S. Charles, 1988), pp. 17-18.

²⁶Robert C. Stacey, “The Age of Chivalry,” The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman, editors, (New Haven: Yale, 1994), pp. 27-39.

²⁷The Laws of Armed Conflicts (A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents) Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, Editors (Leiden: A. W. Sijhoff, 1973) pp. 287-88.

²⁸ E. Bartlett Kerr, Surrender and Survival (The Experience of American POW’s in the Pacific, 1941-1945) (New York: William Morrow, 1985) pp 25-26.

²⁹ Donald Knox, Death March (The Survivors of Bataan) (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981) p. 154 and Stanley L. Falk, Bataan (The March of Death) (New York: Modern Literary Editions, 1962) p. 49.

³⁰ Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II: Final Report (7 December-31 December 1946) p. 7.

³¹ Knox, Death March(The Survivors of Bataan), Note p. 269.

³² Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) p. 109.

³³ Stanley L. Falk, “Introduction,” in Knox, Death March (The Survivors of Bataan), pp. xxi-xxii, also, Note, p. 269.

³⁴ Lawrence Taylor, A Trial of General (Homma, Yamashita, MacArthur) (South Bend, IN: Icarus Press, 1981) p. 129.

³⁵ Ibid, pp. 129-30.

³⁶ Ibid, pp. 130-31.

³⁷ Ibid p. 194.

³⁸ MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 296.

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Taylor, A Trial of Generals, pp. 7-12.

⁴¹ Falk, Bataan (The March of Death), pp 200-03.

⁴² John W. Dower, Enbracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: Norton, 2000), p. 516.

⁴³ U.S. Army, Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II: Final Report, p. 77.

⁴⁴ Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, p. 259.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 258.

⁴⁶ G. S. Graber, History of the SS, (New York: David McKay, 1978) p. 202.

⁴⁷ Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, p. 257.

⁴⁸ Trial of Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume IV, Proceedings 17 December 1945 – 8 January 1946, p. 329.

⁴⁹ J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Third Edition, 1947) p. 144.

⁵⁰ Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1953) p. 5.

⁵¹ See U.S. Army, The Army Lawer: A History of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 1775-1975, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. government Printing Office, 1975) p. 212.

⁵² Ibid, p. 213.

⁵³ Garrett, P.O.W. The Uncivil Face of War, p. 207.

⁵⁴ Ibid, pp. 207-218.

⁵⁵ 22 C.M.R. 250 (1957).

⁵⁶ 22 C.M.R. 258.

⁵⁷ Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 684.

⁵⁸ Carl Berger, “Introduction,” in The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, Carl Berger, Editor, (Washington, D.C. Office of Air Force History, 1977) p. 3.

⁵⁹ Jacob Van Staaveren, “The Air War Against North Vietnam” in The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, p. 69.

⁶⁰ Carl Berger, “American POW’s and Operation Homecoming” in The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, p. 321.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid, p. 326.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 336.

⁶⁴ John M. McGrath, Prisoner of War: Six Years in Hanoi (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1975), p. 8.

⁶⁵ Author’s notes from Col. Jones’ lecture on February 26, 1991. Also see The Times-Picayune March 31, 1973, sec. 1, p. 8; and April 14, 1985, p. A-1.

⁶⁶ Berger, “American POW’s and Operation Homecoming.” p. 336; Garrett, P.O.W.: The Uncivil Face of War, pp 230-31; and the author’s notes of February 26, 1991.

⁶⁷ Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, USN, Ret., and his wife, Sybil, In Love and War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994) pp. 101-104.

⁶⁸ Ibid, pp. 149-202, 232-294, 326-360, and 392-404.

⁶⁹ Ibid, pp. 206-208.

⁷⁰ The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971) pp. 379-380.

⁷¹ In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Random House, 1995).

⁷² As I Saw It, (New York: Norton, 1990)pp. 497-500.

⁷³ P. 44.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ See “Maltreatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, “Boston University Law Review, Vol. 48 (1968) pp. 323-359.

⁷⁷ Vol. 52, No. 10 (October 1969) pp. 38-49.

⁷⁸ John F. Loosbrock, “Peace, Law, and Our Men in Hanoi”, p 8.

⁷⁹ Maurice L. Lien, “The Plight of the Prisoners”, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 32-37.

80 Loosbrock, p. 4.

⁸¹ Keith Johnson, “Acting to Aid the Forgotten Men”, pp. 15-21.

⁸² “Commentary”, Air Power and Warfare, Colonel Alfred F. Hurley, USAF, and Major Robert C. Ehrhart, USAF, editors, (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government, 1979) pp. 330-332.

⁸³ In Love and War, pp. 177-179.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p 181.

⁸⁵ “The Tiger Cages of Con Son”, Life, July 17, 1970, pp. 26-29 at 27.

⁸⁶ Ibid. Also, see “Tiger Cages”, Newsweek, July 20, 1970, p. 27 and Richard Pyle, “U.S. Officials Lack Power to Remove ‘Tiger Cages’”, The Times-Picayune, July 8, 1970, sec. 1, p. 15.

⁸⁷Ibid

⁸⁸ Berger, Ibid., pp. 321, 338

⁸⁹ Col. James P. Coyne, USAF, Ret. Airpower in the Gulf (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation, 1992) pp. 106-109; and The Times Picayune (New Orleans, LA) March 16, 1991, p. A-6.

⁹⁰ “Female POW Assaulted in Iraq,” The Times-Picayune, June 11, 1992, p. A-12. Rhonda Cornum, as told to Peter Copeland, She Went to War: The Rhonda Cornum Story (Novalto, CA: Presidio 1992).

⁹¹ James H. and William M. Belote, Corregidor: The Saga of a Fortress (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) pp. 180, 201.

⁹² Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq (Air Power and the Gulf War) (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1992) pp. 128-29.

⁹³ Pauline Jelinek and Michael Elliott, “The Making of a Fiasco,” Newsweek, October 18, 1993, pp 34-38; “Captured Pilot Was Ridiculed by Somali Mob,” The Times-Picayune, October 9, 1993, p. A-6’; “Downed Pilot Recalls Crazed Mob,” The Washington Post, November 5, 1993, p. A2; and Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1999) pp. 192-195, 228, 259-312.

⁹⁴ Richard Hartzman, “ASIL UN Observer Report – UN Considers International Criminal Court, ASIL Newsletter (September – October 1996) pp. 15-17 at 15.