Panel TC18: The European Union’s Mediterranean Enlargement
ISA 2001 Chicago
February 20-24 2001
Five
years of the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: progress without partnership?
Richard G. Whitman
Dr. Richard G. Whitman
Director
Centre for the Study of Democracy
University of Westminster
100 Park Village East
London NW1 3SR
Tel: + 44 20 7911 5138
Fax: + 44 20 7911 5164
Email: whitmar@westminster.ac.uk
In a wide-ranging survey on the security aspects of European integration in 1991 Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, defined Europe's 'Southern flank' as encompassing the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the Middle East and the requirement for economic development by the states of the region as a pre-requisite for the peace and stability of the region.[1] In February 1995, Willy Claes, then NATO Secretary General, launched a new NATO initiative for the Mediterranean by identifying Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to European security comparable to communism.[2] These very public declarations, identifying a concern with trans-Mediterranean threats, represented manifestations of the re-formulation of the European security order, and security concerns, in the aftermath of the Cold and Gulf Wars.[3] This provided the backdrop to a new EU policy towards the region that is explored in this paper. More recently it has become commonplace to refer to the Mediterranean as the ‘Near Abroad’.[4] This is intended to encapsulate the notion that there is both geographical proximity, suggesting that the region cannot be ignored, but also that the EU considers the region not to be full of the European/EU political space.
In focusing in terms of the potential security threats that are considered to impact upon Europe from the Mediterranean region, commentators have noted the interdependent relationship that exists with the region. The suggestion is that, in terms of security, the primary threats to Europe in the region are not derived from the malevolent use of state power directed against continental Europe but rather from the partial, or full, collapse of the existing political authorities in the southern and eastern Mediterranean.[5] Furthermore, for these commentators the southern and eastern Mediterranean appears to be replete with the security threats identified by the re-definers, or ‘wideners’ of the concept of security.[6] The interrelated sources of instability that have been identified encompass poor economic performance, control of key energy supplies, demographic change and population movements, Islamic revivalism and cultural difference, terrorism, drugs trafficking, depletion of natural resources, and conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation.[7]
In the examination of major European institutions a common analysis of the perception of potential security threats to Europe in the Mediterranean is apparent. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU) has each defined a security interest in the region, identified the Mediterranean as a region with which it is interdependent, and, consequently, adopted a Mediterranean dimension to its policies.[8] However, the different remits and realms of activity for the three organisations have led to divergent responses and different first-order concerns. This paper focuses upon the EU by highlighting the EU’s definition of security challenges in the region as the primary driver for recent policy development towards the region.
The primary determinants for an interest in the Mediterranean by the EU are proximity and divergence. In this sense there is a rendering of the region as the ‘Near Abroad’. The proximity of North Africa and the Middle East to Europe ensures that the region cannot be easily ignored - although other proximate regions, notably Central and Eastern Europe, are prioritised. Secondly, by a stress upon measures of socio-economic development across the Mediterranean basin, disparities and difference (or more accurately divergences) are stressed as existing between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean (excluding Israel).[9] Difference rather than commonality comes to the fore in relations between the EU and the non-Member States in the Mediterranean basin.
The European Union's proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), with the proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA) - its centrepiece - launched in 1995, represented a redefinition of the conception of the Mediterranean for the EU. One perception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is that it represented an updating of existing policy towards the region.[10] This paper suggests that the EMEA was the consequence of the re-definition of the concept of security on the part of the EU and the Union's identification of a security threat emanating from the region. This is illustrated by charting the EU’s policy towards Mediterranean non-Member States. The paper proceeds by briefly outlining the EC/EU policy towards the Mediterranean pre-Barcelona and offering an examination of the Barcelona Declaration itself, before turning to a consideration of the multilateral and bilateral stands of the process. The focus of the paper is not directly upon the EU’s role in the Middle East peace process - itself worthy of lengthy analysis - but on how the fortunes of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership have been intertwined, and conditioned, by the peace process.
The EEC began to develop its trade and aid relations with the existing non-Members in the region in 1963 with the signing of an Association Agreement with Turkey. Association Agreements between Cyprus and Malta and the Community followed and both, like Turkey, were to subsequently submit applications for membership of the Union. From 1965 to 1993 the EC provided 672.5 million ecu from the EC budget and 262 million ecu in European Investment Bank (EIB) loans for the three associates.[11]
Between 1976 and 1977 the Community established co-operation agreements with certain countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), and the Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) and Israel. These agreements provided for trade concessions, quotas for access to the EC market and economic aid.[12] Between 1973 and 1991 the Union provided 1,337 million ecu in aid and 1,965 million ecu in loans from the EIB.[13]
With the 1982 review of the EC's Mediterranean policy the Community launched a policy revision towards the Mediterranean region intended to assist in the diversification of agricultural production and to promote food production. This policy was not entirely consistent with the large volume of EC agricultural exports to the region and further adjustments were required by the accession of Portugal and Spain to the Community in 1986. The new Mediterranean policy, introduced in December 1990, was intended to support economic liberalisation and democratisation.[14] Financial protocols covering the years 1992-1996 under the new Mediterranean Policy, adopted in December 1990, allocated 1,075 million ecu in aid and 1,300 million ecu in EIB loans together with 300 million ecu in support of structural adjustment.[15]
In the interim the Commission also detailed specific strategies for the Maghreb, Mashreq and Israel and for support of the Middle East Peace process.[16] For the latter, the Community has provided 500 million ecu in grants and EIB loans. The Commission's own assessment of the New Mediterranean policy was mixed, noting that dependence upon Community agricultural exports remained; co-operation among the partners had not substantively increased; and that aid from the Community budget only represented an average of 3% of the total aid to the region between 1989 and 1992.[17]
The Lisbon European Council meeting in June 1992, anticipating the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by 1 January 1993, illustrates an early attempt by the Union to draw together both the external relations of the Community and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the context of the putative European Union. The Mediterranean thereby was being considered as an objective for a nascent foreign and security policy. The Mediterranean was dealt with under both the Community's external relations and under a CFSP heading with the breakdown of the region between the Maghreb and the Middle East (meaning the countries of the Mashreq and Israel) maintained across both processes. The Presidency's conclusions on the Community's external relations focused upon both the Maghreb and the Middle East - a distinction that was followed in the report approved by the European Council from the Foreign Ministers on the likely development of the CFSP and detailing the areas for possible joint action under the CFSP.[18]
By the Corfu European Council meeting in June 1994 the range of relations with Mediterranean countries were subsumed under a CFSP heading and a mandate was given to the Council, together with the Commission, to evaluate ‘the global policy of the European Union in the Mediterranean region and possible initiatives to strengthen this policy in the short and medium term, bearing in mind the possibility of convening a conference attended by the European Union and its Mediterranean partners’.[19]
Subsequently, initiatives and responses to the region, under the instruments of the CFSP, were less well developed until the creation of a Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region agreed in June 2000.[20] The Member States created a Joint Action in support of the Middle East peace process (April 1994) which has included involvement in the monitoring of the Palestinian Autonomous Authority (PAA) elections , financial support for the PAA, and the creation of an EU special envoy (Angel Morantinos). However, it is the silences which are, perhaps, more interesting than the actions. For example, to date there has been no Common Position or Joint Action on Algeria despite the conflagration there. The Common Strategy is examined below.
The Road to Barcelona
The Commission's response to the challenges presented by the Mediterranean Basin was a proposal for a new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched by the Commission in a communication to the Council in October 1994.[21] In introducing its proposal the Commission drew its rationale from the CFSP annex of the Lisbon European Council conclusions reiterating: ‘the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean as well as the Middle East are geographical areas in relation to which the Union has strong interests both in terms of security and social stability’.[22]
The Commission Communication can be viewed both as a response to the invitation of the European Council and also as a contribution to any discussions at a possible conference of EU and Mediterranean partners. In proposing such a Conference, the Commission view was that such a forum could create an appropriate institutional framework to give effect to the partnership. The Commission Communication explicitly excluded a focus upon the countries of the former Yugoslavia.[23] The primary focus was upon relations with countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia), the Mashreq (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria) and Israel and noting the existent relations with Turkey, Malta and Cyprus.[24] The Euro-Mediterranean partnership was intended to encompass all of these states of the Mediterranean basin and the EU.
The approach proposed by the Commission was for a strategy of variable geometry progressively updating the existing agreements that exist with the states of the region and also creating sustained support through a programme comparable to PHARE. The programme replaced eleven independent financial protocols and cost the Union 5.5 billion ecu between 1995-1999.[25] This Commission figure of 5.5 billion ecu was subsequently reduced following significant disagreement at the Cannes European Council in June 1995. A disagreement between Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Gonzalez on the appropriate distribution of resources committed to Eastern Europe and the South represented a classic North-South EU state disagreement. The Commission proposal for 5.5 billion ecu for the Mediterranean and 7 billion ecu for Eastern Europe was opposed by the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark which wanted to maintain a ratio of aid distribution of 5:1 that had existed from 1992-1996. The final result was a shift to a ratio of 3.5:5. The increase of resources for the Mediterranean was equivalent to an increase of 22% and for Eastern Europe 8%.
The notion of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was intended to be an objective, rather than an immediately attainable project. The process of achieving such a partnership was to come through a twin-track approach of the progressive development of a free trade relationship alongside the increased, and enhanced, provision of financial aid. Through this twin-track approach, accompanied by enhanced political co-operation, there would be a move ‘towards a close association, the content of which will be defined at a later stage.’[26]
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was therefore intended to meld a close political dialogue, extending to security issues, with an enhanced economic relationship. In particular, the provision of Community aid was to be furnished for the purposes of structural adjustment and economic restructuring. In signing up to the programme the participants were thus committing themselves to a comprehensive liberalisation of their trade systems and a restructuring of their economies - thereby the EU was actively promoting the Washington consensus.
The economic dimension of the Partnership was to result in the long-term in a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA) providing for a free trade area that encompasses the Member States of the Union, the Mediterranean non-Members and any Central and Eastern European countries that remain outside the Union. The free-trade area would provide for reciprocal free trade in manufactured products and preferential and reciprocal access for agricultural products ‘of interest to both sides’.[27] The co-operation was also intended to extend beyond free trade to encompass areas including energy, the environment, drug trafficking and illegal immigration.[28]
The multilateral structure envisaged for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was to be achieved alongside, and through, a set of bilateral agreements. The Commission envisaged creating a series of Euro-Mediterranean Agreements - association agreements with Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon - as soon as possible to replace the then existing co-operation agreements.[29] In the short term, five objectives were detailed: the conclusion of the then current negotiations with Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey; an increase in technical and financial assistance and, in particular, through the creation of a MED aid programme; the encouragement of private investment; an ‘economic policy dialogue’ under the auspices of the Association Agreements; and measures to promote regional co-operation amongst the Mediterranean states.
The Commission defined two primary challenges to the potential to peace and stability in the region to be faced by the Union: ‘ - to support political reform, respect for human rights and freedom of expression as a means to contain extremism; - to promote economic reform, leading to sustained growth and improved living standards, a consequent diminution of violence and an easing of migratory pressures.’[30]
The Commission also acknowledged the interdependent relationship between the Union and the other states of the region detailed above through the environment, energy supply, migration, trade and investment and the production and smuggling of narcotics. The European Council meeting in Essen approved the recommendation of the Council supporting the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and endorsed the proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in the latter half of 1995 for ‘a permanent regular dialogue on all subjects of common interest.’[31] The EMP represented the approval of an instrument that was intended to forge a ‘regional’ entity between third party states in the region and thereby replicate a pattern of region-to-region relations that is the preferred form of international relations for the Union.
The Barcelona Conference
Several difficulties arose in the preparatory work for the Barcelona Conference. These included the unwillingness of Syria and Lebanon to participate in a ministerial meeting with Israel and Moroccan doubts that were based on a desire to maintain privileged relations with the EU especially with the negotiations for an Association Agreement well underway. The Spanish attempted to mediate on the latter difficulty by making clear that Morocco would be a favoured location for the location of permanent bodies, organiser of the second ministerial meeting etc. Morocco’s attitude indicated the failure of the idea of regional integration in the Maghreb. Then the US, Russia and the Gulf countries expressed an interest in the conference. Finally, in June 1995 the Arab Maghreb Union adopted a common position that it wanted Libya to be associated with the process. The majority of EU states were opposed and Libya withdrew its request to participate in October. The General Affairs Council reached a general position on the conference on 31 October 1996 on the basis of the Spanish proposal that the conference should be limited to 27 countries.
Work on the Barcelona Declaration preceded on the basis of a succession of 15+12 meetings based on an EU draft of the declaration. Hostility arose from Arab countries from the treatment of subjects of a social nature (terrorism, drugs, immigration) as ‘security’ issues and more specific issues, such as Egypt’s desire to see the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically referred to, the Palestinians’ wish for a mention of the right to self-determination and the Syrian-Lebanese insistence on a distinction between terrorism and the right to defend one’s territory.
A number of issues remained unresolved when the conference
commenced: self-determination, non-proliferation, dialogue on debt, formulating
the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (agricultural
products and freedom of movement), and re-admission for illegal immigrants.
Even the final declaration was delayed by two hours because of disagreement
over the political and security section of the document.
The Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona between 27 and 28 November 1995 brought together the EU and twelve Mediterranean countries. Libya remained uninvited. The Union’s position at the conference was somewhat contrastive to the other states of the region who lack a collective common position. As a Jordanian diplomat noted prior to the conference, ‘Barcelona will be the European Union facing 12 countries, each with its own agenda and not listening to the others’.[32] The conference was the first occasion in which Israel, Syria and the Lebanon attended the same multilateral forum. The conference illustrated differences between the EU and the Mediterranean non-Members with the latter preferring a greater stress on the economic, rather than the political, and Tunisia and Algeria favouring Libya’s participation.
For its part the Union proposed two main elements to form the basis of the partnership established through the conference.[33] Firstly, a political and security partnership, described as establishing a common area of peace and stability and founded upon the adoption of a declaration of principles by all the partners setting objectives for internal and external security in two broad areas: human rights, democracy and the rule of law; and stability, security and good-neighbourly relations. Secondly, an economic and financial partnership, building a zone of shared prosperity, through the trade and aid relationship detailed above. The first of these objectives has yet to be achieved, the second is a somewhat longer-term aspiration that is unlikely to be easily realised.
The Barcelona Declaration and the multilateral strand of
activities
The 26 page Declaration agreed at Barcelona comprised chapters and an annex which set out the priorities for the work programme. The Declaration established three chapters of activity that have guided the subsequent activities of the multilateral strand of the process: 1) Political and Security Partnership: establishing a group-to-group dialogue starting with a list of confidence building measures and a list of principles including respect for international law, democracy and the rule of law; 2) Economic and Security Partnership: developing the free trade area for establishment by 2010 through a process of negotiation of bilateral association agreements encouraging the right climate for investment, and co-operation on shared problems such as the environment and the use of energy resources; and 3) Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs.
The overall tasks of co-ordination, management of the work programme and preparation of the follow-up Conferences of Foreign Ministers have been handled by a Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process composed of representatives of the EU Troika and of the Mediterranean Partners. The Commission has been responsible for the preparatory and follow-up work of the Barcelona process.
The assumption upon which the Barcelona institutions were created was that a group-to-group dialogue could be created between the EU and the non-Member States. The realisation of this Mediterranean Partner ‘collective identity’ has not happened. This can be illustrated through the work undertaken in the three chapters, which has been patchy to date.
The most high profile of the Euro-Med institutions has been the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The difficulties involved in the scheduling, conduct, and the outcomes of these meetings is illustrative of the problems with the process itself. The Second Conference at Foreign Minister level, envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration to occur in the first half of 1997, highlighted the problematic nature of the EU’s position in seeking to keep the Barcelona Process and the Middle East peace process as separable. Disagreement over the location for the meeting illustrated the inseparability. Syria refused to participate in any meeting with Israel on Arab territory. Despite staunch efforts on the part of Morocco to host the event, Syria's position was immovable and Malta was finally selected as the location.
The issue of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, raised in March 1997, and the call by the Arab League for a boycott of relations with Israel, ensured that the Malta meeting held between 15-16 April 1997 was dominated by the Arab-Israeli dispute. Disagreement was such that the participants failed to agree on a set of conclusions for the meeting. Conclusions were eventually agreed, and publicly released, almost one month later, after an agreement on a form of words to cover the Middle East Peace Process and on the contentious issues of human rights, illegal immigration and terrorism.
The Union itself explicitly acknowledged the linkage of the Middle East peace process and the Barcelona process by hosting a meeting between Yasser Arafat and the then Israeli Foreign Minister, David Levy, in Valetta during the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in the presence of the Dutch President of the Union, the EU envoy for the Middle East Moratinos, and the Egyptian and French Foreign Ministers.[34]
Eventual agreement on the Conclusions of the Malta Conference, the agreement to continue the three multilateral strands of the process, and agreement to hold a third Ministerial Meeting in the first half of 1999, illustrated that the participants do not find the continuation of the process intolerable. However, the lack of new substantive areas of co-operation to come from the Malta meeting illustrates that the perpetuation of the multilateral strand of the process was contingent upon the continuation of the Oslo process. However, this was not the exclusive reason, as confirmed by a spokesman of the Arab-Mediterranean group, who summarised the situation for each of the pillars one and two prior to the conference as, respectively, one ‘remains fragile’, and two should be ‘specified’ and pillar three, on social and cultural aspects, as ‘impasse’.[35]
An informal Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in Palermo on 3-4 June 1998 acted as a re-launch of the process after the problems of the Malta ministerial. The change of attitude was primarily that of the Arab-Mediterranean group of countries who took the view that the Euro-Mediterranean process should be preserved in spite of the problems with the Middle East peace process. The most important agreement at the informal ministerial was to resume negotiations on the stalled draft Stability Charter.
The third Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference in Stuttgart between 15-16 April 1999 was notable for the participation of a delegation from Libya as a ‘special guest’ (meaning an observer) of the German Presidency, a similar status of that accorded to Mauritania.[36] Stuttgart did not generate striking results but set the progress back on track by ensuring that it was now separable from developments in the Middle East peace process. The programmed discussions in Stuttgart focused on four main areas: foreign and security policy (an exchange of views on the draft Stability Charter); the progress in the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area; economic cooperation and transition and the launching of projects in the environment, industry, energy, maritime transport and information society sectors; and the cultural, social and human aspects of collaboration. The Arab Mediterranean countries raised the question of Libya’s full participation in the process. It was agreed at Stuttgart that Libya could become a member of the process once the UN Security Council lifted sanctions imposed on Libya and if it accepted the terms of the Barcelona Declaration in full.
Another informal (Palermo-type) Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting took place in Lisbon between 25 and 26 May 1999. This meeting produced no communiqué or conclusions. The meeting focused on an exchange of views on political issues concerning the region, assessed progress on the draft Charter for Peace and Stability, and assessed the progress in the economic and financial dimensions of the partnership.[37] Libya again participated as a ‘special guest of the Presidency’.
Despite the continuation of the timetabled meetings of the Barcelona Process a widespread view prevailed that the process required ‘reinvigoration’. This was a view that the European Commission echoed in a Communication from the Commission to the Council in September 2000.[38] The Commission reiterated the objectives of the process and pointed to the dual objectives of the process in both promoting regional integration alongside economic transition. In addition to suggesting revisions in the implementation process of Barcelona, the Commission proposed (as a new departure) that in order to facilitate the proposed free trade area by 2010 each Mediterranean third country that signs an Association agreement with the EU should also conclude a free trade agreement with the other signatory countries within five year.
The most recent Ministerial Conference, the fourth, took place in Marseilles in November 2000. The deterioration of the political climate in the Middle East and the upsurge in violence from September 2000 overshadowed the meeting. Although reinvigoration was the theme the Ministerial Conference was largely a reiteration of the commitment to the process by its partners. In particular, the adoption of the Charter for Peace and Stability, expected to be approved, was deferred.[39]
The multilateral structures of the Barcelona Process have been a mixed success. At the level of Ministerial Conferences the vicissitudes of the Middle East peace process have ensured that this has not been a forum in which there has been marked successes after the Barcelona meeting in 1995. It is not surprising that the highpoint of the Middle East peace process (the signing of the Oslo Accords) was only two and a half months prior to the Barcelona conference – arguably the high-point of the multilateral strand of the Euro-Mediterranean Process.
There has, therefore, largely been process without progress. It is commonplace to state that the Barcelona Process is the only multilateral forum (outside the United Nations) where the parties in conflict in the Middle East meet. Considered in these terms the perpetuation of the process is, itself, an achievement and a contribution to the Middle East peace process. However, the relationship between the EU and its interlocutors in this process is not one of partnership. Rather, the ‘attractive’ power of the EU’s trade and aid offerings sustain the process as illustrated in the bilateral strand considered below. Where there has been success, albeit limited, has been at the sub-Ministerial meeting level. The dialogue conducted at the level of senior officials in the political chapter, the regional fora established under the economic and financial chapter, and the activities under the social, cultural and human chapter have been sustained through the difficulties of the Middle East peace process.
The MEDA programme constitutes the main financial instrument used by the EU for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. MEDA I (1995-1999) had a budget of ecu 4.685 billion. Over 85% per cent of the funds were allocated on a bilateral basis, the rest for financing regional activities. Funds were committed in four areas: support for structural adjustment (16%); support for economic transition and private sector development (30%); development projects to support a strengthening of the socio-economic equilibrium (40%); and regional projects (14%).
The MEDA programme came into force on 2 August 1996 following the lifting of the Greek veto on 15 July 1996 and a similar amount in EIB loans.[40] This figure measured in per capita terms is about three times lower than that devoted to Central-Eastern European countries. The aid disbursement is different from that which existed previously towards the region in that is not assigned country by country but on the basis of the ability to perform and succeed in reaching assigned targets. Financial aid is also devoted to supporting regional economic co-operation and development - especially considering that the free trade area will be extended to all the EU's partners.
MEDA was a departure from the previous means of funding the Mediterranean non-Member States in that there were no fixed country financial allocations – these were replaced by National Indicative Programmes (NIPs).[41] A key dimension of MEDA is the MED Committee through which the EU Member States advise/oversee the Commissions role in implementing the programme.
MEDA has been subject to considerable criticism. One of the primary criticisms of the partner countries is the level of financial assistance available through MEDA funds and the slow disbursement of assistance.[42] A recognition of the need to streamline the decision-making process and to enhance programming and implementation was accepted by the Commission in October 1999 and the regulation covering MEDA was subsequently amended.[43] The implementation process has been, in the Commission’s own analysis, hampered by complicated procedure both in the EU and in the partner countries.[44] Furthermore a number of programmes (MED URBS, MED CAMPUS, MED MEDIA[45]) for decentralised cooperation were suspended from the end of 1995 until April 1998 because of concerns of administrative irregularities and fraud raised by the EU’s Court of Auditors. In a separate report the Court of Auditors has expressed its concerns about the capacity of the Euro-Med countries to absorb financial assistance, overlong delays in payments by the Commission and the low rate of survival of projects due to a lack of co-ordination between technical experts and local administration.[46]
MEDA II, which will run from 2000 to 2006 has an increased budget of €5.35 billion. In addition the EIB has allocated €6.4 billion for loans to the Mediterranean for 2000-2007. MEDA II will focus more on preparing the Mediterranean partners for implementing the free trade area agreements and ‘South-South’ regional integration. The Mediterranean countries and the Community draw up three-year National Indicative Programmes (as with MEDA I) containing priorities for bilateral aid. A Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), as under MEDA) covers the multilateral dimensions of MEDA II. The MEDA II programme is currently making its way through the European Parliament. The European Parliament has been concerned with seeking the simplification of the implementation process of MEDA II and proposed amendment to the programme to support national sustainable development plans in the assisted countries.
Success measured in trade and investment terms under the auspices of the process has been negligible. The levels of EU investment into the non-Member Mediterranean States remain low. Trade between the partners has not increased. The EU market is the most significant for the states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean basin and for those countries who do not enjoy the same form of preferential trading agreements (PTAs) negotiated by the EU with Central and Eastern Europe. The EMEA will end the non-reciprocal industrial preferences enjoyed by the Euro-Med partners within the framework of their past agreements with the EU. EU agricultural protectionism has not been eliminated and a constant request by the partner counties is that there should be greater market access for these products. The EMEA will therefore bring about extensive exposure to EU competition without providing any significant additional market. Furthermore entering into a Free Trade Area (FTA) with the EU will mean that the Mediterranean Partner countries will lose tariff revenue presently collected from EU imports - currently estimated at almost 50% of imports.[47] The Mediterranean Partners will not gain free population movement and thereby not solve one of their most pressing problems through the migration of labour.
The impact of a Free Trade Zone on the economic activity, and employment, upon the different Partner countries is likely to be variable.[48] The impact of a policy pursued through free trade agreements can be illustrated by scenarios for two partners, Morocco and Tunisia as the two star performers (measured in terms of growth) in the MENA region. Analysis by economists suggest that the GDP of Morocco and Tunisia may rise by 1.5% and 1.7% of GDP respectively. To put this into perspective, the increase in the cumulative per capita income over ten years would be $25 per person in Morocco and $40 per person in Tunisia.[49] This would hardly re-dress the differentials that are of current concern to the EU and does not imply equitable income distribution.
The hope that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) may flow from liberalisation may be a forlorn one. FDI has been declining in the region except for Morocco, Turkey & Tunisia.[50] Despite Tunisia’s average GDP growth of 5% FDI flows were only $180 million in 1994 as opposed to $240 million in 1993. Furthermore an EU study has predicted that the increased competition could see 2,000 local companies go out of business and the status of a further 2,000 is questionable.[51] Moroccan economists have argued that the overnight removal of tariff levels of 30-35% will wipe out some 50-60% of the Moroccan industrial sector immediately.[52] The realisation of these scenarios would generate the social unrest, political instability and migration pressures that the EU Euro-Med policy purports to counter.
The bilateral strand of the Barcelona process has resulted in more concrete achievements than the multilateral process. Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been signed and ratified with Tunisia, Israel, and Morocco and there has been an interim association agreement with the Palestinian Authority. An agreement has been signed with Jordan and awaits the completion of ratification and an agreement was concluded with Egypt in June 1999 (however, the Egyptian government has been unwilling to formally assign its signature until January 2001). An Agreement is being currently negotiated with Lebanon. Negotiations with Algeria opened on 4 March 1997 (the Union has maintained its engagement with the governing regime in Algeria and has continued to grant financial aid[53]) and talks have been under way with Syria since April 1998. The latter three sets of negotiations have proceeded extremely slowly. Libya’s participation in the bilateral strand of the Barcelona process remains unestablished as it is still unwilling to sign the Barcelona Declaration.
The opening of membership negotiations with the Republic of
Cyprus and more recently Malta demonstrates that the EU is
willing to deploy its strongest foreign policy instrument towards two states in
the region. The saga of Turkey’s possible membership of the EC/EU dating
from its Association agreement is not ended despite altered status of Turkey
with respect to membership post-Helsinki. The case of Turkey clearly
illustrates the possibility of membership of the EU is a significant instrument
for the EU to deploy. This paper does not reflect on the relationship between
the EU and these states as they are covered by other papers in this panel.
In June 2000 the EU adopted a Common Strategy on the
Mediterranean Region as one of the new Common Strategy CFSP instruments
introduced under the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997. The Common Strategy
is a tool of the CFSP and for that reason its purpose is to set out what the EU
Member States position is in a particular area. The Common Strategy is
intended to cover the EU’s relations with all states in the Barcelona process
and Libya but to exclude the bilateral relations with EU candidate countries
where relationships are handled through the accession process. With the
Barcelona Process as its centrepiece, the Common Strategy indicates
clearly the extent to which the EU’s external relations and the CFSP are
intertwined. In particular the Common Strategy states that there is
‘…the aim if reinvigorating the Process and making it more action-orientated
and results-driven’. The Common Strategy has yet to be actively
implemented and the current Swedish Presidency of the EU has drawn up
priorities for implementation during its term in office.[54]
The creation of a Common Strategy of the CFSP for the Mediterranean
reinforces the perception that, in the view of the Union, security is the prime
motivator of the EU engagement with the region.
Conclusion
The cursory examination of the instruments deployed in EU-Mediterranean relations illustrates the characteristics of EU policy in their relationship. From the standpoint of the EU a particular kind of agreement has been offered – signalling that EU membership is only considered a possibility for a limited number of states in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, a specific aid programme has been created to signal a commitment supported by financial resources.
These instruments illustrate the degree of EU involvement, and when set alongside other similar assessments of third parties, make it possible to assess other different gradations of EU relations with third parties. Therefore an analysis based on this approach can be used not only to flag-up significant developments but also to rank that third party relationship alongside those of others. By extending this analysis it becomes possible to discern more readily the EU’s international identity.[55]
The European Union
embarked upon a new strategic partnership for the Mediterranean as a
counterpoint to its strategy towards Central and Eastern Europe in 1995. The
depth and extent of this policy was contrastive to the measures undertaken by
NATO and the WEU.[56] The
essential cause of this difference in the level of response is that the EU is
best equipped to cope with predominant security challenges that emanate from
the region. In contrast to Europe the Mediterranean region lacks the
proliferation of institutions that can be identified in Europe. The Conference
on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) proposed by Italy and Spain
in September 1990 that would extend beyond the Mediterranean basin to encompass
the Middle East has not yet been realised. In the absence of any alternative
multilateral structure the EU's EMP represents an attempt by the Union to play
the leading role in the pacification of sources of potential instability it has
identified in the region by offering a partnership that has yet to be realised.
[1] J. Delors, ‘European integration and security’ Survival vol. XXXIII, no.2, March/April 1991, pp.99-109.
[2] Agence Europe 9 February 1995.
[3] As an illustrative survey of
these shifting concerns see:
E. Mortimer, European Security after the Cold War Adelphi Paper 271 Summer 1992.
[4] See for example:
C Piening, Global Europe: The European
Union in World Affairs (London, Lynne Rienner, 1997). Chapter 4.
C. Bretherton & John Vogler, The
European Union as a Global Actor (London, Routledge, 1999). Chapter 5.
T. Chrisiansen, F. Petito & B. Tonra, ‘Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The European Union’s ‘Near Abroad’’ Cooperation and Conflict, 35 (4), pp.389-415.
[5] E. Mortimer, 'Europe and the Mediterranean: The Security
Dimension' in;
P.Ludlow (ed.), Europe and the Mediterranean (London, Brassey's
for CEPS, 1994).
I.O. Lesser, Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges (Santa Monica, RAND, 1993).
[6] See for example;
Richard H. Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’ International Security
8, 1 (1983). pp.129-153.
B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International
Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era Second Edition (1991).
For a discussion of the positions of 'traditionalists' versus
'wideners' see:
B. Buzan, O. Wæver & J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner, 1998). Chapter One.
[7] M. Blunden, ‘Insecurity on
Europe's Southern Flank’ Survival 36, 2. pp.134-148.
F. Stephen Larrabee & C. Thorson, Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges (Santa Monica, RAND, 1996).
[8] See R. Whitman, Securing Europe's southern flank? A comparison of NATO, EU and WEU policies and objectives, Report for NATO fellowship 1997-1999. http://www.natio.int/acad/fellow/97-99/f97-99htm.
[9] This disparity can be clearly
measured through the Human Development Index; see:
M. Benyaklef, ‘Socio-economic Disparities in the Mediterranean’ Mediterranean Politics 2, 1 (Summer 1997). pp.93-112.
[10] Piening, op.cit., Chapter 4.
[11] 'Europe and the Mediterranean' Background Report ISEC/B21 Commission of the European Communities December 1994.
[12] Idem
[13] Idem
[14] Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy SEC (89) 1961 final. 23 November 1989 & SEC (90) 812 final 1 June 1990
[15] Idem
[16] SEC(92) 40 Final 30 April 1992; COM (93) 375 Final 8 September 1993; COM (93) 458 Final 29 September 1993
[17] 'Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Proposals for Implementing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' COM (95) 72 Final. Annex 2.
[18] Conclusions of the
Presidency Lisbon, 26-27 July 1992 , Commission of the European
Communities, London, BIO/92/166 2.
The report on the development of the CFSP was contained in Annex I and Declarations on the Middle East Peace Process and relations with the Maghreb in Annexes III & IV respectively.
[19] Presidency Conclusions 24-25 June 1994, European Council at Corfu, Commission of the European Communities, London, SN150/94.
[20] Official Journal L183/5, 22.7.2000.
[21] Strengthening op.cit.,
[22] Strengthening p.4
[23] Idem
[24] Mauritania was not included with the Maghreb states as it is already covered by the Lomé Convention.
[25] Strengthening p.11
The Commission proposed that the
financial support should focus upon five priority objectives;
- support for the process of economic modernisation and restructuring
of those countries prepared to open their markets in the context of new
Association Agreements;
- support for structural adjustment in countries less advanced in this
process with a view to preparing them for entering into free trade with the
Union;
- support for regional cooperation particularly in the environment;
- strengthening of North-South economic and financial cooperation, and
among southern and eastern Mediterranean countries themselves, particularly
through programmes of decentralised cooperation particularly through programmes of decentralised
cooperation linking key actors in the
cultural, social and economic fields
- support for the Middle East peace process
[26] Ibid., p.2.
[27] Ibid,. p.10.
[28] Ibid p.3
[29] 'Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Proposals for Implementing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' COM (95) 72 Final.
[30] Ibid
[31]Presidency Conclusions 9-10 December 1994 Essen, Commission
of the European Communities
Annex Council report for the European Council in Essen concerning the future Mediterranean Policy
[32] 'Barcelona Euro-Med conference to be a turning point' Reuters Euro Community Report Wed, Aug 9, 1995.
[33] 'Conclusions of Cannes June 26-27 Summit' Reuters Euro Community Report , 28 June, 1995.
[34] Agence Europe No. 695617 April 1997. p.2.
[35] Agence Europe No. 6955 16 April 1997. p.4
[36] Other ‘Special Guests’/Observers to the process are the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and the Arab League.
[37] Agence Europe 24 May 2000. p.10.
[38] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, To Prepare the Fourth Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers: Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process Brussels, 6.9.2000. COM (2000) 497 final.
[39] Libya was again in attendance as a guest of the Presidency.
[40] 'Progress Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Preparations for the Second Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers' Agence Europe No.2028 13 March 1997. pp.1-8.
[41] The NIPs are restricted to nine of the partners: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the West Bank/Gaza. Aid to Cyprus and Malta is outside MEDA and the aid to Turkey is supplemented with pre-existing financial agreements. Israel is not entitled to aid.
[42] Views expressed by Med country ambassadors at the hearing held by the European Parliament Delegations for Cooperation with the Maghreb, and the Mashreq and Gulf countries. And as reported in Agence Europe No.7172 4 March 1998. Pp.10-11.
[43] Council Regulation No.2698/2000 of 27 November 2000. OJ L311/1 12.12.2000.
[44] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, To Prepare the Fourth Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers: Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process Brussels, 6.9.2000. COM (2000) 497 final..
[45] Concerned with, respectively, the improvement of living conditions for people in urban areas, bringing together universities from north and south of the Mediterranean for networking, and to develop networks in the training sector of media and journalism.
[46] Agence Europe 7 May 1998. P.12.
[47] Agence Europe No.1005 5 May 1997.
[48] See the analysis contained within H. Zaafrane & A. Mahjoub, ‘The Euro-Mediterrranean Free Trade Zone: Economic Challenges and Social Impacts on the Countries of the South and East Medierranean’ Mediterranean Politics 5 (1), (Spring 2000). pp.10-32.
[49] For a full analysis see:
J. Page & J. Underwood, 'Growth, the Maghreb and Free Trade with
the European Union' in:
A. Galal & B. Hoekman, Regional Partners in Global Markets: Limits and Possibilities of the Euro-Med Agreements (London, CEPR, 1997).
[50] G. Joffé, 'Southern Attitudes towards an Integrated Mediterranean Region' Mediterranean Politics 2, 1 (Summer 1997). pp.24-26.
[51] J. Marks, 'High Hopes and Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative' Mediterranean Politics 1, 1 (Summer 1996). pp.17-18.
[52] Ibid
[53] Agence Europe 15/16 May 1995 p.8.
[54] These were presented at the
most recent General Affairs Council Meeting. See:
Council Secretariat Press Release 22/01/2001 Nr. 5279/01
[55] I.J. Manners & R.G. Whitman, ‘Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU’s network of relationships’ Journal of European Integration 21, 2 pp.231-249.